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DEREGULATORY RIDERS REDUX
Thomas 0. McGarity*
Soon after the 2010 elections placed the Republican Party in control of the
House of Representatives, the House took up a number of deregulatory bills. Rec-
ognizing that deregulatory legislation had little chance of passing the Senate,
which remained under the control of the Democratic Party, or of being signed by
President Obama, the House leadership reprised a strategy adopted by the Re-
publican leaders during the 104th Congress in the 1990s. The deregulatory
provisions were attached as riders to much-needed legislation in an attempt to
force the Senate and the President to accept the deregulatory riders to avoid the
adverse consequences offailing to pass the more important bills.
This Article examines the deregulatory riders of the 104th Congress and the
experience to date with deregulatory riders during the 112th Congress. Although
riders are not inherently good or evil, the Article concludes that riders, like the
deregulatory riders examined here, that advance narrow special interests over the
general public welfare represent bad public policy. The Article examines several
methods for discouraging deregulatory riders, but concludes that none of them are
likely to be implemented until the public signals its strong disapproval of deregu-
latory riders.
INTRODUCTION............................................... 34
I. LIMITATION RIDERS AND LEGISLATIVE RIDERS.....................37
II. DEREGULATORY RIDERS IN THE CLINTON YEARS................. 39
A. Deregulation in the Authorization Committees ............... 40
1. Amending the Clean Water Act........ .............. 40
2. Amending the Occupational Safety and Health Act ....... 42
B. Deregulation Through Riders ..................... 43
1. FY 1995 Rescissions ............ ............... 44
2. FY 1996 Budget ............. .................. 46
III. DEREGULATORY RIDERS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS ................ 51
A. Deregulation in the Authorizing Committees ................... 53
1. Climate Change Deauthorizing Legislation ................ 53
2. Amending or Repealing the Dodd-Frank Act.............. 57
B. Deregulation Through Riders ..................... 64
1. The 2011 Continuing Resolution ................ 64
2. The SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011............ 67
3. The 2012 Appropriation Bills ................... 67
Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Endowed Chair in Administrative Law, University
of Texas School of Law.
33
Michigan Journal of Environmental &Administrative Law
IV. THE RIDER AS A POLICYMAKING TOOL...................70
A. Benefits of Riders..................................71
B. Costs of Riders.....................................71
1. Transparency and Accountability .................. 72
2. Lack of Due Deliberation ....................... 73
3. Lack of Expertise.............................76
4. Special Interest Pandering........... ............ 77
5. Extortion ................................... 78
V. SOLUTIONS ....................................... 80
A. Constitutional Amendment ................ ........... 81
B. Change the Rules ........................ ............. 82
C. Public Disapproval.................................83
CONCLUSION. ............................................ 85
INTRODUCTION
With much of the world anxiously looking on during the sweltering
summer of 2011, the United States barely avoided a worldwide economic
disaster as Congress and President Obama struggled to enact legislation to
raise the statutory ceiling on the government's debt.' The purpose of the
debt ceiling when it was established by Congress in 1917 was to force Con-
gress periodically to deliberate over the amount of United States
indebtedness and come up with ways to limit it.2 Because they simply au-
thorize the Treasury to pay debts previously incurred, bills raising the debt
ceiling are normally relatively noncontroversial and are often accomplished
by attaching a provision raising the debt ceiling to a budget or appropria-
tion bill.3 However, the 2011 debt ceiling bill provided an ideal vehicle for a
determined minority of Tea Party-driven Republicans in the House of
Representatives, eager to reduce government spending, to extract conces-
sions from the Obama administration.4
It was a clear case of extortion, and the president ultimately capitulated
to the undisguised threat to bring on worldwide economic catastrophe: a
failure to increase the debt ceiling would force the United States to default
1. See, e.g., Elizabeth Drew, What Were They Thinking?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 18,
2011, at 13, 13.
2. See D. ANDREW AuSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967,
THE DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 2-3 (2010).
3. See id. at 10-12; Drew, supra note 1, at 13. Between March 1962 and the end of
2009, Congress raised the debt ceiling a total of seventy-four times. AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra
note 2, at 3.
4. Drew, supra note 1, at 13.
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on its obligations.5 Days before the deadline, President Obama and House
and Senate leaders reached an accord under which the President and the
Democratic leaders agreed to $917 billion in spending cuts over a ten-year
period in return for a two-stage, $900 billion increase in the debt ceiling.6
Additionally, a twelve-member "Super Congress" would, by December 23,
2011, come up with $1.5 trillion in additional deficit reduction by cutting
operating and entitlement expenses and raising taxes.7 If that process failed,
specified cuts from domestic and defense programs would automatically go
into effect.8 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke stated that
the unseemly fight had "disrupted financial markets and probably the
economy as well."9 Nevertheless, Senate Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell (R-Ky.) promised more of the same in the future; the standoff
over the debt ceiling provided "the new template" for achieving the Repub-
lican Party's policy goals so long as President Obama remained in the
White House. 0
As the debt ceiling incident suggests, politics in the twenty-first centu-
ry has become extremely polarized, especially on issues related to the role
of government in regulating business activities." Not only is there little
agreement on common goals, there is also a much-reduced commitment to
- * * 12 *
civility in political discourse. Few boundaries confine the subject matter of
partisan brawls, and the participants recognize few limits on the vitriol
expressed in their attacks. In this highly competitive environment, the
legislative process has become far more strategic. And for issues with
respect to which a substantial number of legislators are unshakenly commit-
ted to an ideological or economic goal, negotiation and compromise are not
the strategies of choice. For many politicians in important positions in
Congress, the object of the legislative process is not to produce legislation
that best serves the public interest; the goal is to win. And if political
5. See Fred Barbash & Richard E. Cohen, Summer of Strife, 69 CQ WKLY. 1736,
1736-39 (2011); Michael Hirsch, Vantage Point: What Just Happened?, NAT'L J., Aug. 4, 2011,
at 8; Robert Schlesinger, Lessons for the Next Debt Fight, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 12,
2011), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/08/12/1essons-for-the-next-debt-fight.
6. The Debt Ceiling Deal: No Thanks to Anyone, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6-12, 2011, at 25, 25.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium: The Near-
and Longer-Term Prospects for the U.S. Economy 12 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20ll0826a.pdf.
10. Schlesinger, supra note 5 (quoting Mitch McConnell) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
11. See Susan Davis & Major Garrett, Storm Clouds Ahead, NATIL J., Aug. 6, 2011, at
30, 30-31; Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 670-72 (2006).
12. See Jane Harman, Escape from the Asylum, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 2011, at 28, 28, 31.
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damage can be inflicted on members of the opposing party in the process,
so much the better.
In this kind of toxic legislative environment, one of the more effective
strategies for securing legislative victories and imposing political pain is the
rider, a provision added to an unrelated bill that "rides" the targeted bill
through the legislative process and becomes law when the President signs
the bill. Since the early nineteenth century, Congress has made policy
through such add ons to must-pass legislation like appropriation bills, bills
raising the debt limit, or bills that are so politically attractive that support-
ers will tolerate the riders to ensure that the bill is enacted.'3 Although
riders have always played a role in enacting controversial laws, they have
become far more common since the 1990s. By attaching riders to appropria-
tion bills and other must-pass legislation, the leadership of the House of
Representatives has attempted to avoid presidential vetoes and sidestep the
lengthy process of pushing legislation through the authorizing committees
that have subject-matter jurisdiction over particular substantive issues.14
This Article will examine a particular class of riders that is designed to
stall, modify, or eliminate an ongoing regulatory program that is being
implemented by a regulatory agency pursuant to duly enacted authorizing
legislation. Usually pursued at the behest of affected regulated industries,
these "deregulatory riders" threaten to derail ongoing regulatory programs
that are highly popular with the general public and therefore not likely to
be dismantled through the normal legislative processes. Although riders are
sometimes necessary to avoid antimajoritarian congressional roadblocks,
when they are used to advance the narrow interests of a regulated industry
(or an individual company) in avoiding new or ongoing regulatory pro-
grams designed to protect workers, consumers, and the environment, riders
are indistinguishable from the legislative "earmarks" that have attracted
much criticism in recent years.
This Article will focus on one especially disturbing feature of riders
that has been on display during the 112th Congress: their extortionate use
by a determined minority of legislators to advance special interests at the
13. See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation
Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 461-63; Lazarus, supra note 11, at 674-76. For example, the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act, which has had a profound impact on the
congressional budgetary process, was originally introduced as a rider to a joint resolution to
raise the debt ceiling. See John F. Hoadley, Easy Riders: Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the
Legislative Fast Track, 19 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 30, 31 (1986). The first significant regulation
promulgated by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, a regulation setting safety
standards for lawn mowers, generated such a powerful outcry from the industry that Con-
gress passed an appropriation bill rider requiring the agency to weaken the standard. See
Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Con-
sumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 89, 93-94 (1982).
14. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 674-76.
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expense of the broader public interest. Part I will offer a brief description
of riders. Part II will describe the battles over deregulatory riders during
the Clinton administration, which serve as a precedent for the ongoing
battles over deregulatory riders during the past two years of the Obama
administration (discussed in Part III of the Article). Part III will focus
specifically on the recent strategic use of riders by House Republicans to
dismantle and redirect two nascent regulatory programs: the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's (EPA) greenhouse gas reduction program and the
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) established by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.'s
Part IV will then offer a critique of those efforts, highlighting the potential
for abuse inherent in the practice of deregulation through riders. Finally,
Part V will offer some suggestions for eliminating or mitigating the disad-
vantages of deregulatory riders in the future.
I. LIMITATION RIDERS AND LEGISLATIVE RIDERS
Riders come in two broad varieties -limitation riders and legislative
riders.' 6 The limitation rider is associated exclusively with appropriation
bills, and it prohibits the relevant agency from expending any of the appro-
priated funds to engage in a proscribed activity. 7 This is an effective tool
because it is unlawful under the Antideficiency Act for any individual to
spend monies in contravention of such a command in an appropriation
act.'8 A legislative rider modifies existing law by amending an existing stat-
ute, changing existing common law, or directing a federal agency to take a
particular affirmative action (thereby rendering lawful administrative action
that might otherwise have been unlawful)." In the House of Representa-
tives, the distinction between limitation and legislative riders has been
incorporated into the so-called "Ramseyer Rule," which requires committee
reports on bills to show in detail how the bill, including legislative riders,
will affect existing law.20 By convention, limitation riders (which always
15. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
16. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 635-36.
17. Id.; Devins, supra note 13, at 461.
18. 31 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). Because the appropriations process has over the years
become complex to the point of incomprehensibility, involving multiple committees, bills,
and procedural stages, those who understand it well can easily use it to their own ends. See
generally Jason M. Patlis, Riders on the Storm, or Navigating the Cross winds ofAppropriations and
Administration of the Endangered Species Act: A Play in Five Acts, 16 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 257,
262-66 (2003).
19. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 636.
20. CLERK OF THE H.R., 112TH CONG., RULES OF THE H.R. r. XIII(3)(e) (2011),
available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf.
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originate in the House Appropriations Committee) are not subject to the
21Ramseyer Rule.
Although the bulk of riders-both limiting and legislative-are
attached to appropriation bills, Congress has imposed action-forcing mech-
anisms in other kinds of legislation that can produce similar opportunities
for attaching unrelated riders. 22 The statute requiring Congress to approve
increases in the debt ceiling provides an ideal vehicle. When trying to
reauthorize existing programs that by statute expire on a certain date, au-
thorization committees can find themselves operating under the same
pressures as appropriations committees to allow extraneous riders.2 3
Likewise, bills introducing tax breaks or reauthorizing tax advantages can
become vehicles for extracting concessions from the bill's supporters on
matters that may or may not be relevant to the purpose of the tax legisla-
*24tion..
21. For an example of the Ramseyer Rule in action, see H.R. REP. No. 112-151, at
134-39 (2011), listing changes to the law made by legislative riders in compliance with the
rule but without mention of the limitation riders in the related bill.
22. See, e.g., SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 493, 112th Cong. (2011).
23. A good example is the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (PDUFA), Pub. L.
No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992), which required applicants for new drug approvals by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to pay substantial "user fees" to the FDA to be
devoted exclusively to new drug reviews. The bill was intended to be an experiment in
speeding up the approval process, but it provided that the user fee program would expire
after five years if Congress did not renew it. See PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S
HEALTH 279 (2003); Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of Improvements in the FDA's New
Drug Approval Process: The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 483,
487-88 (1992); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1795-96 & n.131 (1996). When the Act came up for renewal in
1997, Congress enacted the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997). In the process, the drug industry
extracted a number of additional concessions from FDA as a condition to allowing the user
fees to continue, most of which were deregulatory in nature. For example, the statute
"streamlined" the agency's good manufacturing procedures, allowed manufacturers to circu-
late peer-reviewed articles from medical journals to promote drugs for unapproved uses,
required FDA to use the "least burdensome" procedures for approving medical devices, and
eliminated the mandatory post-market surveillance requirements for device manufacturers.
Id.; see also STEPHEN J. CECCOLI, PILL POLITICS 159 (2004) (discussing the circulation of
peer-reviewed articles); COMM. ON POSTMARKET SURVEILLANCE OF PEDIATRIC MED.
DEVICES, INST. OF MED., SAFE MEDICAL DEVICES FOR CHILDREN 82, 95 (Marilyn J. Field
& Hugh Tilson eds., 2005) (discussing less burdensome procedures and elimination of post-
market surveillance).
24. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Tobacco Rider Adds Fire to Debate Over Corporate Tax
Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2004, at A4 (describing an attempt to add a rider authorizing
FDA to regulate tobacco as "the most significant corporate tax legislation in two decades").
The must-pass bill that becomes the vehicle for the riders is "literally akin to a Christmas
tree on which enough members of Congress have hung their favorite ornaments with little
regard (or perhaps even knowledge) of what else is on that same tree." Lazarus, supra note
11, at 662.
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Legislative riders are more controversial than limitation riders for a
number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that they are more
likely to intrude into the jurisdictions of the authorization committees from
which substantive legislation is supposed to emerge.2 5 Limitation riders
tend to be less worrisome because they remain in effect for only a single
fiscal year and face expiration on an annual basis. In the context of entitle-
ment programs and licensing regimes, however, limitation riders can
achieve a surprising degree of permanence. For example, a limitation rider
prohibiting EPA from expending any appropriated monies to require
greenhouse gas reductions for the purpose of climate control in any Clean
Air Act (CAA) would have a semi-permanent effect, extending for the life
of permits issued that year.26
II. DEREGULATORY RIDERS IN THE CLINTON YEARS
The current battles over deregulatory riders in the 112th Congress are
by no means unprecedented. The strong proponents of deregulation in the
House of Representatives have adopted many of the strategies of the
Republican-controlled House during the last six years of the Clinton
administration. Deregulatory riders played a prominent role in the highly-
publicized budget battles of the 104th Congress, where their advocates were
only moderately successful. The proponents of deregulatory riders, howev-
er, quietly persisted in their efforts through the 105th and 106th
Congresses, with some notable successes. Their successors in the 112th
Congress have carried the lessons learned during that period of mixed
government forward into the ongoing battles described in Part III.
The 104th Congress was assembled in the wake of the 1994 off-year
elections that put the Republican Party in control of the House of Repre-
sentatives for the first time in a generation. 27 Hitting the ground running,
the House Republicans conducted an intense campaign to fulfill promises
they had made in the "Contract with America" to enact several ambitious
25. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 636.
26. The appropriation bill for FY 2012 that emerged from the House Appropriations
Committee contained such a rider. See H.R. REP. No. 112-151, at 115-16 (2011). As a practi-
cal matter, this rider exempted any new permit applicant from EPA's existing requirement
that large sources install the best available control technology for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions for the relevant year. See id. Presumably, applicants receiving a permit during that
year would not have to control greenhouse gas emissions until some year in which Congress
failed to renew the rider. In my view, this was not a limitation rider, because it changed
existing law for a year, rather than limiting EPA's ability to implement existing law with
appropriated funds. But the Appropriations Committee apparently did not view it as a
legislative rider, because it was not included in the section of the Committee's report that it
devoted to substantive changes in the law under the Ramseyer rule. See id. at 134-39.
27. See LINDA KILLIAN, THE FRESHMEN 3-4 (1998).
Spring 2012] 39
Michigan Journal of Environmental &Administrative Law
pieces of omnibus regulatory-reform legislation during the first 100 days
that Congress was in session. Although they delivered on their promise,
the omnibus legislation for the most part died in the Senate. 29 A second
wave of amendments to specific statutes like the Clean Water Act (CWA)
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) also foundered in
the Senate, where the chairpersons of the relevant committees were moder-
ate Republicans not interested in advancing radical reforms. Stymied by
both the sixty-vote majority needed to overcome a threatened filibuster in
the Senate and by President Clinton's promise to veto bills that cut back on
health, safety, and environmental protections, the House leadership adopt-
ed a strategy of attaching deregulatory riders to appropriation bills.3 0
A. Deregulation in the Authorization Committees
Initially, the House leadership attempted to enact deregulatory legisla-
tion through the normal procedures employing the relevant authorization
committees. The authorization committees in the House held a number of
hearings on proposals to repeal or radically amend several of the bedrock
safety and environmental statutes. Two of the statutes that were targeted
for the most comprehensive rewrites were the CWA and the OSHAct.
1. Amending the Clean Water Act
Viewed by many environmentalists as "one of the nation's most success-
ful environmental laws, 3 2 the CWA's past emphasis on "technology-based"
standards made it a prime target of industrial and municipal dischargers, 3
and its wetlands protections were anathema to private real estate developers
28. See id. at 3-12.
29. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Deflecting the Assault: How EPA Survived a "Disorganized
Revolution" by "Reinventing" Itself a Bit, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,249, 11,250-55
(Nov. 2001).
30. See Fred Barnes, Zero Hour, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 1995, at 18, 18-19; Jeff Shear,
Pain's the Game, 27 NAT'LJ. 108, 111 (1995).
31. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 641-42.
32. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-427 ENR, CLEAN WATER:
SUMMARY OF H.R. 961, As PASSED (1995), available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/crsreports/
water/h2o-5.cfm.
33. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Water Res. & the Env't of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 104th Cong.
1804-23 (1995) (statement of Neil Jaquet, Manager, Water Resource Development, Coors
Brewing Company); id. at 601-03 (testimony of Winifred Perkins, Edison Electric Insti-
tute); id. at 223-25 (testimony of Skip Missimer, American Forest and Paper Association);
Industry Coalition Details Reforms Sought Under Revised Clean Water Act, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2071 (Mar. 1, 1996).
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and property rights activists.34 During the frenetic first 100 days, House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Bud Shuster (R-
Pa.) introduced a bill that would have rewritten all of the core provisions of
the twenty-five-year-old statute, required EPA to rewrite existing standards
and limitations to comply with a new cost-benefit decision criterion, and
replaced EPA's wetlands program with a less protective program.3s
Environmental groups complained about the procedures under which
the House subcommittee marked up the bill, arguing that the "closed door,
private sessions"36 offered "industry and special interests [the opportunity]
to craft their dream bill." 7 Confirming these allegations, the tag line at the
top of the faxed copies of the draft legislation sent to committee Democrats
indicated that it had originated in an industry law firm.3' Despite the pro-
tests, however, the committee approved the Shuster bill with only minor
amendments, and the bill easily passed the full House.3 9
Calling the bill the "Dirty Water Act," Clinton promised to veto the
bill if it passed the Senate in its present form. 40 Additionally, Senate Envi-
ronment and Public Works Committee Chairman John Chafee (R-R.I.) did
not convene a hearing until mid-December, and that hearing was only
called to obtain views on what issues should have priority in any Senate
rewrite effort. 41 The bill died a quiet death in the Senate committee.
34. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, supra note 33, at
924-41 (statement of Virginia Albrecht, Partner, Beveridge & Diamond); id. at 836-37
(testimony of Ronald Anderson, American Farm Bureau Board of Directors); JEFFREY A.
ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95028: WETLAND ISSUES 4 (1997).
35. See H.R. REP. No. 104-112, at 184 (1996); COPELAND, supra note 32 (detailing
H.R. 961's alterations to core provisions of the CWA); ELIZABETH DREW, SHOWDOWN:
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GINGRICH CONGRESS AND THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE
226 (1997); ZINN & COPELAND, supra note 34, at 8-9; Provisions in CWA Rewrite Bill 'Trou-
bling,' EPA Water Chief Says at Subcommittee Hearing, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2031 (Feb. 24,
1995).
36. House Transportation Committee Excludes EPA, Environmental Groups From Panels
Revising CWA, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2298 (Mar. 17,1995).
37. Oil Group Is Part of Water Act Review, 73 Oilgram News (Platts) No. 62, at S (Mar.
30, 1995).
38. Gareth Cook, Laws for Sale, WASH. MONTHLY, July 1995, at 44, 46.
39. H.R. REP. No. 104-112, at 187-200 (1996) (voting records of Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure); 141 CONG. REC. HS,013 (daily ed. May 16, 1995) (voting
record of H.R. 961).
40. DREW, supra note 35, at 226 (noting Clinton's reference to the "Dirty Water
Act").
41. See Chafee Indicates Preference for Narrow Bill as Municipal Concerns Aired at Senate
Hearing, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1565 (Dec. 22, 1995).
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2. Amending the Occupational Safety and Health Act
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had
been the poster child of the regulatory reform movement since the early
days of the Carter administration.42 Horror stories abounded of OSHA
inspectors citing employers for allowing workers to chew gum on jobs, for
failing to provide warnings on dishwashing liquid, and for other minor
infractions of OSHA regulations. 4 3 The chairman of the Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections of the Economic and Educational Opportunities
Committee was Representative Cass Ballenger (R-N.C.), a highly vocal
critic of OSHA since his years as the owner of a plastic bag manufacturing
business. 44 After conducting a series of hearings on alleged OSHA abuses
in the spring of 1995, Ballenger introduced a bill that would have drastically
changed how OSHA promulgated and enforced occupational safety and
health standards. 45 The Department of Labor responded with a report
predicting that the Ballenger bill would cause workplace injuries to increase
by 50,000 per year and subject 50,000 more workers per year to increased
risk of contracting work-related diseases.46
42. See generally ROBERT STEWART SMITH, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY
RESEARCH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND ITS
ACHIEVEMENTS (1976); Philip J. Harter, In Search of OSH-A, REG., Sept./Oct. 1977, at 33.
According to a June 1996 survey of the Chamber of Commerce membership, American
businesses believed that OSHA regulations were by far the most burdensome of all the
federal rules employers faced. OSHA Rules 'By Far' Most Burdensome, National Chamber of
Commerce Survey Says, 26 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 113 (July 3,1996). A bumper sticker described
OSHA as "America's KGB," busily turning the "American Dream into a Nightmare." Mi-
chael Weisskopf & David Maraniss, The Hill May Be a Health Hazard for Safety Agency,
WASH. POST, July 23, 1995, at Al.
43. See, e.g., Corrections Day Policy and Procedures: J Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Nat'l Econ. Growth, Natural Res., & Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform &
Oversight & the Subcomm. on Rules & Org. of the H. of the H. Comm. on Rules, 104th Cong. 18
(1995) (statement of Hon. Tom DeLay, Majority Whip of the H.R.); Reich's Denial of OSIA
'Chewing Gum' Rule Exemplifies Regulatory Confusion, Group Says, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1725
(Jan. 25, 1995). But see Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 104th Cong. 70 (1995) (statement of Joseph A. Dear, Assistant Secretary,
Occupational Safety & Health) (denying horror stories).
44. See DAVID MARANISS & MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, "TELL NEWT TO SHUT UP!" 57-
58 (1996); Kirk Victor, Sitting Duck, 27 NAT'LJ. 1999, 2000-01 (1995).
45. Safety and Health Improvement and Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1834,
104th Cong. (as introduced June 14, 1995); see also Dear Calls Republican Plan an Invitation for
Non-Compliance, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 2442 (May 17, 1995) (describing the administra-
tion's position); OSHA Berated by Industry Representatives Before House Oversight Subcommittee
Hearing, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1876 (Feb. 22, 1995) (discussing the hearings held by Repre-
sentative Ballenger).
46. DOL Report Claims Congressional Efforts Would Reverse 25 Years offob Safety Progress,
25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 364 (Aug. 2,1995).
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In the Senate, Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan.) chaired the
Labor and Human Resources Committee. A moderate Republican with an
independent streak on social issues, 47 Senator Kassebaum was among the
senators who introduced a more "moderate" OSHA reform bill.48 Vice
President Al Gore announced in a February 19, 1996 speech to top union
officials that the President would veto the bill. 49 By the time the Senate
committee completed its markup on March 4, there were less than fifty
legislative days left in the session. Preoccupied with an ongoing budget
battle, and aware of the veto threat that was hanging over the Kassebaum
bill, Senate leadership apparently decided not to bring it to the floor for a
vote.
B. Deregulation Through Riders
By the fall of 1995, it was becoming clear that omnibus regulatory re-
form legislation was dead and that the efforts to change the agencies'
substantive mandates were unlikely to succeed. After pouring a great deal
of effort into attempts to enact comprehensive amendments to the CWA
and the OSHAct, it was clear to supporters of deregulation that the normal
legislative processes would not yield the radical statutory change that they
had in mind. Public interest groups had used the hearings to feature vic-
tims of irresponsible corporate conduct and to attack the sponsors of the
legislation.s5  More importantly, President Clinton's promise to veto radical
changes made some Republicans in the Senate wary of voting to gut
longstanding safety and environmental statutes. The House leadership
therefore turned its attention to an alternative strategy-the appropriation
rider. House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Tex.) instructed the chair-
persons of the authorization committees that the preferred strategy was to
move substantive legislation through the appropriations process. 5 1
47. Senate to Address OSHA in Full Committee Following GOP's Elimination of Labor
Panels, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1628 (Jan. 11, 1995); Nancy Landon Kassebaum, WOMEN
IN CONGRESS, http://womenincongress.house.gov/member-profiles/profile.html?intlD=125
(last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
48. Occupational Safety and Health Reform and Reinvention Act, S. 1423, 104th
Cong. (as introduced Nov. 17, 1995); Kassebaum to Move Bill in September; More Moderate
Approach Expected in Committee, 25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 508 (Aug. 30, 1995).
49. President Will Veto GOP Bills, Gore Tells Top Labor Union Officials, 25 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) 1292 (Feb. 21, 1996).
50. See, e.g., Hearings on Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. of the H. Comm. on Econ. & Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong.
111-19 (1995) (statement of Thomas Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO); Lazarus,
supra note 11, at 641-42.
51. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 676-77.
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1. FY 1995 Rescissions
The first potential must-pass vehicle to serve as a carrier for substan-
tive riders was a bill to rescind previously appropriated FY 1995 monies in
order to provide funds for certain emergencies (for example, disaster relief
for victims of the 1994 California earthquake and the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing) and to make a "down payment" on deficit reduction goals. 52 The
House Appropriations Committee reported out a bill containing $10-15
billion of cuts to existing programs.53 It also added several deregulatory
riders to the bill, the most controversial of which required the Forest Ser-
vice and the Bureau of Land Management to sell 6.2 billion board feet of
publicly-owned "salvage" timber over two years, which would double the
yearly yield, and waived all objections under existing environmental laws. 54
The committee also added three air pollution riders offered by committee
member Representative Tom DeLay (R-Tex.). The first two would have
prohibited EPA from requiring states to implement centralized automobile
inspection and employer-based commuter reduction programs in heavily-
polluted areas. The third would have rescinded a court-ordered
implementation plan prepared by EPA for Los Angeles.55
Representative DeLay proposed another last-minute rider on the floor
of the House in a fit of pique over a suggestion by an OSHA employee that
the agency would continue to work on its "ergonomics" standard to protect
employees from repetitive motion injuries even if the House passed a rule-
making moratorium.5 6 After vilifying the agency on the floor, DeLay
proposed a rider to stop the standard in its tracks.5 7 The rider easily
passed.s
52. Jerry Gray, Negotiators Agree on Cuts, but Clinton Veto Is Expected, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 1995, at Al.
53. See Jerry Gray, Republicans Begin Deep Budget Cuts in 5 House Panels, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1995, at Al.
54. Tom Kenworthy & Dan Morgan, Panel Would Allow Massive Logging On Federal
Land, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1995, at Al. See generally Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legis-
lative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 457, 465-86 (1997); Mary Christina Olmsted & Chad Hanson, Op-Ed., The Gorton-
Hatfield Forest Giveaway, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at E15. The rider would have overturned
"decades of environmental policy and compromise relating to logging in sensitive old growth
forests of the Pacific Northwest." Zellmer, supra, at 465-66.
55. See Republican Budget Proposal Would Slash $1.3 Billion from Drinking Water Loan
Fund, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2116 (Mar. 3, 1995).
56. See OSHA Ergonomic Rulemaking Targeted; Additional $3.5 Million Cut in House
Vote, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 2110 (Mar. 22, 1995).
57. 141 CONG. REC. H3,250-54 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995) (remarks of Representative
DeLay).
58. Id. at H3,254; see also OSHA Ergonomic Rulemaking Targeted; Additional $3.5
Million Cut in House Vote, supra note 56.
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In the Senate, the same salvage timber and ergonomics riders were at-
tached to the bills.s' The Senate also added a rider to prohibit the
Department of Agriculture from delineating additional agricultural lands as
wetlands, unless requested by the landowner.o The Conference Committee
retained all of the riders from both houses.6'
President Clinton then exercised the first veto of his administration to
kill the rescissions bill on June 7, 1995.62 The President singled out the
timber salvage rider as an undesirable aspect of the bill.63 In full-page ads in
the New York Times and the Washington Post, environmental groups said,
"Thank You, Mr. President, for Standing Tall!" 64
The celebration was short lived. President Clinton and the Republicans
worked through late June and early July to produce a "compromise" bill that
reinstated $0.5 billion of the original $17 billion in cuts and left all of the
65 66
riders intact. 6 The President signed it on July 27, 1995.66 Concluding that
the President had yielded to the Republicans' threat to withhold disaster
relief monies, outraged environmental groups staged a "21 chain saw salute"
to Clinton in a park across the street from the White House.6 7 Vice President
Al Gore later called the salvage timber rider the Clinton administration's
"biggest mistake."' But the President did have to accept the timber rider
and the other deregulatory riders in order to secure the necessary disaster
relief funds. The Republican leadership could take away from this initial
skirmish the lesson that President Clinton might threaten to veto appropri-
ation bills containing unacceptable riders, but he would ultimately yield if
forced to choose between stopping the riders and ensuring critical funding
for unrelated governmental programs.
59. 141 CONG. REC. S4,869-82 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1995) (salvage timber rider);
Conferees Unable to Reach Agreement; OSHA Again Funded Through Stopgap Measure, 25
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1523 (Apr. 3, 1996); see also Dan Morgan, Aid Packages May Threaten
Budget Cut Plan, WASH. POST, May 12, 1995, at A9.
60. See 141 CONG. REC. S4,883-84 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1995).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 104-124, at 26, 45-53, 62-63 (1995).
62. Ann Devroy, President's First Veto Hits Package of Spending Cuts, WASH. POST, June
8, 1995, at Al.
63. See Alison Mitchell, With First Veto, Clinton Rejects Budget-Cut Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1995, at Al.
64. Alexander Cockburn & Jeffrey St. Clair, Slime Green: The Big Environmental
Groups Help Clinton Sell Out, PROGRESSIVE, May 1996, at 18, 18.
65. See Clinton Signs Bill Cutting $1.3 Billion in EPA Spending Approved for Fiscal 1995,
26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 659 (Aug. 4, 1995); OSHA Relatively Unscathed by Rescissions, but Will
Face Deep Cuts in Fiscal 1996 Spending, 25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 363 (Aug. 2,1995).
66. See Patti A. Goldman & Kristen L. Boyles, Forsaking the Rule of Law: The 1995
Logging Without Laws Rider and Its Legacy, 37 ENVTL. L. 1035, 1047-48 (1997).
67. Ann Devroy, President Approves Rescissions Measure; Process May Offer Glimpse of
Future Showdowns, WASH. POST, July 28, 1995, at A16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Goldman & Boyles, supra note 66, at 1037.
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2. FY 1996 Budget
The skirmish over the FY 1995 rescissions bill was merely a prelude to
the major battle that was brewing over the FY 1996 budget. At the hearings
that the thirteen subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee
held on the proposed budgets of the individual agencies, several trade asso-
ciations and think tanks seized the opportunity to criticize health, safety,
and environmental programs and to urge Congress to disable those pro-
grams. 69 Representative DeLay insisted upon adding seventeen deregulatory
riders to EPA's appropriation bill that would have, among other things,
prevented EPA from promulgating industrial effluent and stormwater
discharge limitations, from enforcing its wetlands protection program, from
finalizing its primary standards for arsenic and radon content in drinking
water, from implementing or enforcing the recently-enacted CAA permit
requirements, and from revoking or refusing to issue tolerances for carcino-
genic pesticides in processed food. 70 The riders would also have suspended
EPA's efforts to promulgate hazardous air emissions standards for refiner-
ies, exempted the oil and gas industry from EPA's accident prevention
programs, reduced the stringency of EPA's planned regulations for hazard-
ous waste incinerator emissions, and prevented EPA from insisting that the
Upjohn Corporation's pharmaceutical plant in Kalamazoo, Michigan treat
its discharges before sending them to the public water treatment plant.
The subcommittee accepted all of DeLay's riders and added some of its
own.72 The subcommittee-approved appropriation bill for the Department
of Labor similarly contained riders that would have prevented OSHA from
publishing its ergonomics standard and from enforcing its fall-protection
regulations for the construction industry.7 ' Despite a determined effort by
69. See, e.g., Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1996: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 107-10
(1995) (statement of C. Boyden Gray, Chairman, Citizens for a Sound Economy); id. at
310-20 (statement of Edward L. Hudgins, Director of Regulatory Studies, Cato Institute);
Downsizing Government and Setting Priorities of Federal Programs, Part 1: Hearing Before Sub-
comms. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 304-21 (1995) (testimony of Fred
Smith, President, Competitive Enterprise Institute); Downsizing Government and Setting
Priorities of Federal Programs, Part 3: Hearing Before Subcomms. of the H. Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 104th Cong. 678-89 (1995) (testimony of Bryan Riley, Economist, Citizens for a
Sound Economy Foundation).
70. See 141 CONG. REC. H7,899-7,900 (daily ed. July 27, 1995); Dan Morgan, HUD
and EPA Biggest Losers in House Panel's Spending Bill, WASH. POST, July 11, 1995, at A6.
71. See 141 CONG. REC. H7,899-7,900 (daily ed. July 27, 1995).
72. EPA Funding Bill Rider Highlights Weakness in Water Act Flexibility Program, 16
Inside EPA (Inside Wash. Publishers) No. 29, at 14 (July 21, 1995); see also Morgan, supra note
70.
73. OSHA Enforcement Would Be Cut By Third; Restriction on Ergonomics Rulemaking
Approved, 25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 288 (July 12, 1995); see also CITIZENS FOR SENSIBLE
SAFEGUARDS, BACK DOOR EXTREMISM: MISUSING THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS To GUT
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Democrats to eliminate the riders, the full Appropriations Committee
made very few changes to the subcommittee recommendations. 74
To the House leadership's surprise, a group of fifty-one moderate
Republicans broke ranks and joined most of the Democrats in approving an
amendment to strike DeLay's seventeen environmental riders.7s Deferring
to DeLay's demands, a second vote was held late Monday evening.
Enough Democrats were still out of town that the re-vote resulted in a tie,
which meant that the riders stayed in the bill. The bill then easily passed
the full House.78 When the House took up the OSHA appropriation bill,
the Democrats did not get as much help from moderate Republicans. An
amendment to eliminate the ergonomics and fall-protection riders failed by
79
a lopsided vote.
Most business groups applauded the budget cuts, and they were
delighted to see the House provide so many deregulatory riders. 0
Environmental groups and labor unions reacted very negatively to the
bills."' Editorial pages across the country bristled with warnings that the
Republicans in the House were pursuing a radical deregulatory agenda. 82
PUBLIC PROTECTIONS 23-26 (1995) (explaining the ergonomics and fall-protection riders
and their impact). Not all of the proposed riders made it into the committee bills. A rider
offered by Representative DeLay to end a decade-old moratorium on offshore oil and gas
drilling in environmentally sensitive areas was rejected after environmental groups launched
a full-scale attack and California and Florida Republicans expressed strong opposition. See
Jerry Gray, Panel Votes to Keep Tobacco Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1995, at A14.
74. See House Appropriations Panel Backs EPA Cuts; Efforts Fail to Strike Environmental
Riders, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 593 (July 21, 1995); OSHA Cuts Maintained in Committee Vote;
Democrats Accuse GOP ofAssault on Workers, 25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 363 (Aug. 2,1995).
75. 141 CONG. REC. H7,954 (daily ed. July 28, 1995); DREW, supra note 35, at 265-66
(quoting DeLay as saying he was "livid" because the "amendment gutted all my regulatory
reform that I had been working on all year" (internal quotation marks omitted)); John H.
Cushman Jr., House Coalition Sets G.O.P Back on Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, at 1;
Michael Weisskopf & David Maraniss, In a Moment of Crisis, the Speaker Persuades, WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 1995, at Al (indicating lack of Republican attention to the issue as a reason
for the vote).
76. 141 CONG. REC. H8,049-50 (daily ed. July 28, 1995).
77. See id.
78. Id. at H8051-52.
79. OSHA Cuts, Ergonomics Restriction Maintained in House-Approved Labor Bill, 25
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 389 (Aug. 9, 1995).
80. See, e.g., Petroleum MACT Standard Moving Forward Despite Congressional Threats to
Funding, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 591 (July 21, 1995).
81. See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR SENSIBLE SAFEGUARDS, supra note 73, at 23-26. See
generally SHARON BucCINO & SCOTT SUROVELL, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, STEALTH
ATTACK: GUTTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THROUGH THE BUDGET PROCESS
(1995) (describing the effects of each budget cut).
82. See, e.g., Editorial, Americans Are Being Robbed of Environmental Protection; Polluters'
Pals are Hard at Work in Congress, BUFFALO NEWS, July 19, 1995, at B2; Editorial, House of
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With the media and public opinion polls indicating that the environment
could be a wedge issue in the 1996 elections, President Clinton jumped at
the opportunity to criticize the Republican sponsors of the appropriation
riders,8 3 and he promised to veto the appropriation bill if it emerged from
the Senate with the riders intact. 84
The Senate Appropriations Committee was somewhat more reluctant
to add riders than its House counterpart, but it did add riders that would
have prohibited EPA from issuing drinking water standards for arsenic,
radon, and several other contaminants; eliminated EPA's power to veto
wetlands permits; prohibited EPA from adding new sites to the list of
superfund sites unless requested by a state; prevented EPA from requiring
automobiles in Fairbanks, Alaska to use oxygenated fuels; and (as in the
House bill) prevented EPA from insisting that the Upjohn Corporation's
pharmaceutical plant in Kalamazoo, Michigan treat its discharges before
sending them to the public water treatment plant. 5 The Senate Committee
incorporated virtually none of the House bill's OSHA riders, observing, in
reference to the ergonomics standard prohibition, that standard setting
was "a legislative matter that should be addressed by the authorizing
committees."
The Republican House leadership faced another revolt when it came
time to appoint the House conferees on the FY 1996 appropriation bill for
EPA. Sixty-three moderate Republicans, mostly from the Northeast, joined
the Democrats in voting to instruct the conferees to delete the seventeen
anti-environmental riders in their negotiations with the Senate. 7 DeLay,
who led the fight in favor of the riders, once again postponed the vote
(twice) in an attempt to schedule it for the most advantageous moment, but
his efforts proved unavailing-the Conference Committee deleted the
seventeen environmental riders." But the Senate's riders, several of which
were identical to the House riders, survived.
Environmental Horrors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at A12; Editorial, Reporting on Pollution,
WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1995, at A20.
83. See, e.g., Margaret Kriz, Drawing a Green Line in the Sand, 27 NAT'L J. 2076, 2076
(1995); Paul Richter, Clinton Acts to Curb GOP Attack on EPA, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at
AS.
84. See Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Lashes out at Congress, Citing Pollution and Guns, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2,1995, at Al.
85. 141 CONG. REc. S14,179-80 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1995).
86. Senate Panel Restores OSHA Funds, Sending 'Clean' Bill Toward Floor Vote, 25 O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA) 603 (Sept. 20, 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. House Abandons Riders on EPA Money Bill; Move Aimed at Maintaining Agency
Enforcement, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1176 (Nov. 10, 1995).
88. Id.
89. See Conferees Approve EPA Funding of $5.7 Billion; Temporary Spending, Reconciliation
Bills Passed, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1265 (Nov. 24, 1995).
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As a government shutdown loomed-the 1996 fiscal year was fast
approaching and there was still no appropriation to pay for it-President
Clinton issued a stern warning that he was not prepared to sign a bill that
would result in "the ravaging of our environment."9 o Belittling the veto
threat, Representative Newt Gingrich's (R-Ga.) argument in response was,
"what if we closed the Government and no one noticed?"9' At a meeting of
the Republican caucus to decide how to deal with the prospect of continu-
ing shutdowns, DeLay and other hard-liners argued strongly against any
compromise. In response to the suggestion that the Senate would not go
along with this approach, DeLay responded: "Screw the Senate. It's time
for all-out war."92
The long-expected train wreck occurred on November 13, when Presi-
dent Clinton and the congressional leadership could not reach agreement on
a second continuing resolution.9' On November 14, all nonessential federal
employees went on leave without pay.94 A poll indicated that fifty-one
percent of those surveyed blamed the impasse on the Republicans, while
only twenty-eight percent blamed Clinton. 95 Although a negotiated contin-
uing resolution did resume government operations on November 20, the
government shut down again on December 15 after a marathon round of
budget negotiations failed and the President vetoed the EPA and Interior
appropriation bills.96 Hundreds of thousands of federal workers were left to
endure the holiday season with no paychecks, and polls continued to indi-
cate that the public blamed the Republicans.9 7 By early January, Gingrich
was willing to go a considerable distance to avoid a continuation of the
shutdown, but he faced stiff resistance from the anti-government Republi-
cans in the House who feared that he would give away too much.' The
second shutdown came to an end on January 6, 1996, pursuant to another
90. Todd S. Purdum, President Warns Congress to Drop Some Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1995, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Jason DeParle, Rant/Listen, Exploit/Learn, Scare/Help, Manipulate/Lead, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Jan. 28, 1996, at 34, 61.
92. Paul Burka, Whipping National Politics into Shape: Tom Delay, TEX. MONTHLY,
Sept. 1996, at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. See DREw, supra note 35, at 328-30.
94. See id. at 330; Ann Devroy & Eric Pianin, Workers Go Home; Talks Go Nowhere,
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al.
95. David E. Rosenbaum, As Standoff Ends, Clinton Is Seeking the High Ground, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at Al.
96. See Clinton Vetoes EPA, Interior Bills; Agencies Shut Down for Second Time, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1552 (Dec. 22, 1995); Federal Government Shuts Down Again as Lawmakers
Disavow Another Resolution, 25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 990 (Dec. 20, 1995).
97. See DREW, supra note 35, at 358; Eric Pianin & Ann Devroy, Congress Leaves for
Recess With Budget Unresolved, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1995, at Al.
98. See Adam Clymer, Leaders in House Drop G.O.P. Plan on US. Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1996, at Al.
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stop-gap continuing resolution." Multiple continuing resolutions were
passed as the two sides negotiated. 00 One of the critical sticking points was
the refusal of the Senate and House negotiators to remove the environmental
and ergonomics riders.' 0'
Finally, on April 26, 1996, the President signed a FY 1996 appropria-
tion bill. 02 In a partial victory for the Clinton administration, the final bill
dropped some of the Senate's environmental riders, weakened others, and
allowed the President to waive the endangered species and salvage timber
riders.103 But it retained the Senate's version of the prohibition on promul-
gating an ergonomics standard104 as well as the riders limiting EPA's ability
to issue certain drinking water standards or add new sites to its Superfund
list.10s The Kalamazoo rider also survived. 06
The bad press that the Republican radicals experienced with appropria-
tion riders during the 104th Congress had little impact on their efforts to
reduce federal safety and environmental regulations. Although President
Clinton was re-elected in 1996, both houses of Congress remained under
control of the Republican Party until the end of the Clinton administration,
and the leadership of the House of Representatives remained committed to
a deregulatory agenda. The House leadership had learned that the public
could react negatively to congressional efforts to force the President to sign
appropriation bills containing provisions designed to gut popular regulatory
programs. But the House leadership could also conclude from the experience
with the rescissions bill that the President was not prepared to veto every
appropriation bill containing riders that he would have vetoed were they in
stand-alone legislation. For the remainder of the Clinton administration,
99. See Adam Clymer, Clinton Meets Challenge by Offering Budget Plan; Crucial Talks
Begin Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996, at 1.
100. See Eric Pianin, Congress Approves Interim Spending; Measure Sends $219 Million to
District, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1996, at Al; Eric Pianin, Congress Passes 11th Interim Spending
Measure, Buys Another Week for Negotiation, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1996, at All; Latest Fund-
ing Measure Avoids OSHA Shutdown but Opens Door for Furloughs, Possible Layoffs, 25 O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA) 1131 (Jan. 31, 1996); Third Shutdown Avoided at Job Safety Agency, With Temporary
Funding Provided Until March 22, 25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1467 (Mar. 20, 1996).
101. See Eric Pianin, Congress Passes 11th Interim Spending Measure, Buys Another Week for
Negotiation, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1996, at All; Gore, Democrats Rip Republican Record;
Senator Defends Riders Against 'Misstatements', 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2370 (Apr. 19, 1996).
102. See Robert Pear, With New Budget, Domestic Spending Is Cut $24 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at 10.
103. See Clinton Signs Omnibus Appropriations Bill, Immediately Waives Environmental
Provisions, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 8 (May 3, 1996).
104. See Congress, White House Agree On Funding Bill; Fiscal 1996 Funds Boosted To $305
Million, 25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1633 (May 1, 1996).
105. 142 CONG. REC. H8,959 (1996); Clinton Signs Omnibus Appropriations Bill, Immedi-
ately Waives Environmental Provisions, supra note 103.
106. 142 CONG. REC. H8,959 (1996).
50o [Vol. 1:1
Deregulatory Riders Redux
Congress continued to enact deregulatory riders, including limitation riders
prohibiting EPA from implementing the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Conention on Climate Change and a legislative rider
amending the CAA to reduce restrictions on certain nonattainment areas.' 07
President Clinton did not, however, highlight the issue of deregulatory
riders, as he had during the 104th Congress, by vetoing the bills to which
the riders were attached.10 With the election in 2000 of a Republican Pres-
ident who was committed to deregulation, the need for deregulatory riders
was less pressing, and the number of appropriation bill riders decreased
dramatically.'09
III. DEREGULATORY RIDERS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS
The Republicans who assumed control of the House of Representa-
tives in the 112th Congress were even more fiercely partisan than the
Republicans of the 104th Congress. A substantial contingent of the new
freshman class of Republican representatives had drawn support from the
nascent "Tea Party" movement that had its origins in the government's
reaction to the financial meltdown of September 2008 and the subsequent
government bailout of Wall Street financial institutions. After disrupting
town meetings of a number of Democratic members during the summer
recess of 2009, the movement successfully supported anti-government
conservatives in the primaries (sometimes upsetting incumbent Republi-
cans).110 During the fall campaign, Tea Party candidates appealed to strong
public resentment over the government bailouts of large Wall Street finan-
cial institutions and growing public concern about the nation's budget
deficit. With the assistance of public relations experts, the Tea Party's lead-
ers effectively channeled public anger at Wall Street into anger at the
federal government for allowing the meltdown to happen and for pouring
billions of dollars of taxpayer money into undeserved bailouts."' They won
a surprising number of contests. After the election put the Republican
Party in charge of the House of Representatives, a new Tea Party caucus
107. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 644-46.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 647.
110. Douglas A. Blackmon et al., Birth of a Movement, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2010, at
Al. See generally Amy Gardner, A Movement Without a Compass, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010,
at Al.
111. See Michael M. Phillips, FreedomWorks Harnesses Growing Activism on the Right,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2009, at A4; Kate Zernike, Shaping Tea Party Passion into Campaign Force,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at Al.
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claimed credit for the change and demanded that the leadership pay atten-
tion to its small-government agenda. 112
Soon after the election, a conservative grass roots organization called
FreedomWorks, headed by former House Majority Leader Dick Armey
(the enforcer of the deregulatory rider strategy during the 104th Congress),
hosted a two-day retreat in Baltimore for newly-elected Republicans." 3
Armey exhorted them not to stray from the limited-government principles
114they had espoused during the campaign. A similar organization called
Americans for Prosperity planned to assemble "grass-roots activists and
coalition partners" to lobby for tax cuts, reduced government spending, and
regulatory relief for American business.115 The members got the message.
The Republican caucus elected John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) to be Speaker of
the House. The Majority Whip was Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), a devotee of liber-
tarian author Ayn Rand."'
At a closed-door meeting, Boehner assured eighty members of the
Business Roundtable (a lobbying organization consisting of the CEOs of
more than 200 of the nation's largest corporations) that he would be work-
ing with them to pursue a deregulatory agenda in the 112th Congress."' As
in the 104th Congress, the Republican leadership apparently planned to
pass stand-alone deregulatory bills through the authorization committees.
But since the Senate remained in the Democrats' control and a Democrat
occupied the Oval Office, deregulatory riders were to play a strategic role
in enacting the legislation. The strategy of the House Republican leader-
ship was to proceed along two paths. First, deregulatory legislation would
proceed through the authorizing committees, which would hold hearings on
particular bills and mark them up for consideration by the full House.
Second, the bills that emerged from committee would also be incorporated
as riders to appropriation bills and other must-pass legislation as opportuni-
ties arose. If the Senate failed to pass or the President threatened to veto
legislation travelling on the first path, it could be forced on the Senate and
the President as it proceeded along the second path. As in 1995, a prime
target for the deregulators was the EPA. And a brand new agency called the
112. See Dana Milbank, Bachmann Goes Rogue Again, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2011, at
A23; Philip Rucker, Is Michele Bachmann Getting the Party Started?, WASH. POST, Nov. 20,
2010, at Al.
113. Amy Gardner, Freedom Works Gathers GOP Lawmakers to Refocus on Tea Party Goals,
WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2010, at Al.
114. Id.
115. Jennifer Steinhauer, Focusing on Next Step, Tea Party Rallies Congressional Freshmen,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010, at A10; see also Jane Mayer, Covert Operations, NEW YORKER,
Aug. 30, 2010, at 45, 46-47, 53.
116. See Jonathan Chait, War on the Weak, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 18, 2011, at 6, 7.
117. See Perry Bacon Jr. & Jia Lynn Yang, Obama Tries Again to Reach Out to Chief
Executives, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2010, at A12.
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) took OSHA's place as the
poster child for the deregulatory movement.
A. Deregulation in the Authorizing Committees
A primary target of the advocates of deregulation was EPA's recently-
established climate change program, which was designed to limit emissions
of greenhouse gases into the environment. In the case of the new CFPB,
the goal was to prevent the new agency from promulgating any regulations
at all under its new authority. In both cases, the initial strategy of the
House leadership was to develop the specifics of the deregulatory bills in
the authorizing committees.
1. Climate Change Deauthorizing Legislation
In early 2009, the stars appeared to be aligned for Congress to enact
the first major environmental statute in almost two decades. In February,
the Obama administration proposed an ambitious cap-and-trade regime for
greenhouse gas emissions, the goal of which was to address climate change
resulting from global warming.1 The House passed its own 1,300-page
cap-and-trade bill in May over the unanimous opposition of House Republi-
cans. Both bills were vigorously opposed by the Chamber of Commerce,
much of the energy industry, and several conservative think tanks."' Amer-
icans for Prosperity hosted eighty grass roots events for Tea Party groups at
which speakers made exaggerated claims that backyard barbeques would be
taxed if Congress enacted the House bill.120 The phrase "cap and tax"
replaced "cap and trade" in the conservative media's echo chamber.121 And
so, after the 2010 elections returned the House to Republican control and
left the Democrats with a razor-thin majority in the Senate, the Obama
118. Margaret Kriz, Changed Climate, NAT'L J., Feb. 7, 2009, at 40, 41; Dean Scott,
Obama Plan Uses 2005 Emissions Baseline; Reductions in Line With Recent Legislation, 40 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 474 (Mar. 6, 2009).
119. Julie Kosterlitz, The Chamber's Summer Offensive, NAT'LJ., July 4, 2009, at 46, 46-
47; John M. Broder, House Backs Bill, 219-212, to Curb Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2009, at Al; see also BEN LIEBERMAN, HERITAGE FOUND., PROPOSED GLOBAL WARMING
BILLS AND REGULATIONS WILL Do MORE HARM THAN GOOD 1 (2009), http://www.
heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/proposed-global-warming-bills-and-regulations-will-
do-more-harm-than-good (criticizing the proposed legislation).
120. Mayer, supra note 115, at 53.
121. See Elwin Green, The Power of Words, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 11,
2009, at C1. For an example of an article using the "tax and cap" language, see Steve Forbes,
Fact and Comment, FORBES, Nov. 2, 2009, at 17, 17-18. For a thorough description of the
conservative media echo chamber, see generally DAVID BROCK, THE REPUBLICAN NOISE
MACHINE (2004); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA, ECHO CHAMBER
(2010); TRUDY LIEBERMAN, SLANTING THE STORY: THE FORCES THAT SHAPE THE NEWS
(2000).
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administration gave up entirely on a climate change bill, opting instead for
modest energy conservation legislation.2
As the prospects for climate change legislation dimmed, EPA seized
the initiative by employing its existing CAA authority.123 First, EPA granted
California's request for a waiver allowing California to regulate auto emis-
sions of greenhouse gases.124 Thirteen states soon followed with their own
identical emissions limits, as permitted by the CAA. 25 Second, EPA made
a formal finding that greenhouse gas emissions "endangered" public health
and welfare, thereby triggering its own obligation to regulate motor vehicle
emissions.'26 Third, EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration jointly promulgated regulations limiting greenhouse gas emissions
and raising fuel economy standards for sedans, SUVs, and pickups.127
Fourth, EPA promulgated a "triggering" rule that required states to incor-
porate greenhouse gas emissions standards into permits for major new
industrial facilities and modifications of existing large industrial facilities.128
These were not welcome developments for the energy industry and
other large greenhouse gas emitters. With financial support from conserva-
tive foundations connected to the energy industry, the Tea Party made
denial of any relationship between emissions of greenhouse gases and
climate change an article of faith. 29 In one survey, "[m]ore than half of Tea
Party supporters said that global warming would have no serious effect at
any time in the future."'30 Tea Party activists made EPA's efforts to curb
greenhouse gases a campaign issue in the 2010 elections by accusing the
agency of destroying jobs.'"' Soon after the 2010 elections returned the
122. See Richard J. Lazarus, Climate Change Law in and over Time, 2 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 29, 30 (2010); Juliet Eilperin & Steven Mufson, Obama Shifting
Climate Strategy After GOP Gains, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2010, at A3.
123. See Ian Talley, EPA Set to Move Toward Carbon-Dioxide Regulation, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 23, 2009, at A2.
124. David A. Fahrenthold, EPA to Let Calif Set Own Auto Emissions Limits, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2009, at A2.
125. See id.
126. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516-36 (Dec. 15, 2009); see also
Carl Hulse, Senate Rejects Republican Effort to Thwart Carbon Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2010, at A22 (discussing Republican opposition).
127. 49 C.F.R. §§ 531, 533, 536-38 (2010); Steven D. Cook, Standard on Vehicle Carbon
Emissions Announced in EPA Greenhouse Gas Limits, 41 Env't Rep. (BNA) 723 (Apr. 2, 2010).
128. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009); Steven D. Cook, EPA Begins to Phase in Require-
ments to Control Stationary Source Emissions, 41 Env't Rep. (BNA) 727 (2010).
129. John M. Broder, Skepticism on Climate Change Is Article of Faith for Tea Party, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at Al.
130. Id.
131. See id.
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House to Republican control, twenty-one industry trade associations,
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of
Manufacturers, and the American Petroleum Institute, asked House and
Senate leaders to insert a rider into an appropriation bill to delay EPA's
implementation of its greenhouse gas reduction regulations.' 32
The climate for climate change legislation in the House of Representa-
tives at the outset of the 112th Congress was radically different from that
the 111th Congress. Half of the eighty-seven newly arrived House freshmen
questioned whether human activities were in fact contributing to global
warming.'3 3 The Republican leadership assigned top priority to legislation
designed to take away EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases and to
repeal the regulatory actions that it had recently taken to address climate
change. As the House Republicans seized every opportunity to divest EPA
of its authority to regulate greenhouse gases, an April 2011 Gallup poll
found that only fifty-one percent of its respondents worried a great deal or
a fair amount about global warming.134
In early March 2011, Representative Fred Upton (R-Mich.) and Senator
James Inhofe (R-Okla.) introduced identical bills to prohibit EPA from
regulating, or even taking into consideration, emissions of greenhouse gas
for the purpose of addressing climate change.13 s The bills also retroactively
repealed EPA's original "endangerment" finding and all of the regulations
that it had promulgated to implement its greenhouse gas reduction pro-
gram.'3 6 Most industry groups supported the bills.'3 7 Several Democrats,
some of whom were ranking members of their committees, also supported
the bills. 3 Environmental groups strongly opposed them.'
The Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce held two hearings on the Upton bill. The first
132. Industry Groups Ask House, Senate Leaders to Delay EPA Rules for Greenhouse Gases,
41 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2676 (Dec. 3, 2010).
133. Margaret Kriz Hobson, Political Tidal Wave Turns EPA Strategy, CQ WKLY., Feb.
14, 2011, at 335, 335.
134. Geof Koss, Last-Gasp Effort to Keep EPA's Authority Intact, CQWKLY., Apr. 4, 2011,
at 744, 745.
135. H.R. 910, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); S. 482, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
136. H.R. 910, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); S. 482, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). The bill made an
exception for EPA's regulation of auto emissions and for two fuel economy standards that
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration promulgated in May 2010. H.R. 910,
112th Cong. § 2 (2011); S. 482, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). An even more extreme bill was
introduced by Senator John Barrasso (R-Wyo.). S. 228, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Barrasso
Bill Would Eliminate EPA Authority to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 42 Env't Rep. (BNA)
217 (Feb. 4, 2011).
137. Dean Scott, Bill Introduced to Bar EPA Emissions Rules; Upton Locks Down Some
Democratic Support, 42 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) (Online) A-10, (Mar. 4, 2011).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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hearing featured testimony from Senator Inhofe, a long-time climate
change denier; EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson; an array of scientists
who were mostly climate change skeptics; representatives of seven major
greenhouse-gas- emitting corporations; and a single scientist representing
the American Public Health Association who argued in favor of greater
greenhouse gas controls.140 The Republican members who attended the
hearing spent more than two hours berating EPA Administrator Jackson,
asserting that the science underpinning her finding was a hoax, and accus-
ing the Obama Administration of killing jobs in a quixotic quest to address
a non-problem.141 Jackson gamely fought back, warning the committee that
its "legacy" would be the unseemly memory of "[pioliticians overruling
0 842
scientists on a scientific question.
A second hearing on March 1, 2011 featured EPA's Assistant Adminis-
trator for Air, representatives of four trade associations that supported the
bill, and an economist who argued that EPA's program would kill jobs.14 3
Only two of the witnesses that day, a Stanford University professor and an
EPA official, testified in favor of leaving EPA's greenhouse gas program in
place. 44 The House easily passed the Upton bill on April 7, 2011.
In the Senate, Democratic Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.) intro-
duced a less extreme bill that would have delayed for two years EPA's
greenhouse gas emissions rules for power plants.146 Like the Inhofe bill, the
Rockefeller bill was referred to the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, which was chaired by Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), a strong
supporter of cap-and-trade legislation. 47 As of late November 2011, the
committee had not taken up either bill. The President may well veto stand-
alone legislation taking away EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases,
should it pass the Senate. It is less clear, however, that he will veto appro-
priation bills or similar must-pass legislation to which a rider reducing or
eliminating EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases is attached.
140. See H.R. 910, the Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Energy & Power of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. v-vi (2011) [hereinafter
Energy Tax Prevention Act Hearings].
141. See id. at 30-72; Hobson, supra note 133, at 335; John M. Broder, House Republi-
cans Take E.P.A. Chief to Task, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at A16.
142. Energy Tax Prevention Act Hearings, supra note 140, at 27.
143. EPA' Greenhouse Gas Regulations and Their Effect on American jobs: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. V
(2011).
144. See id. at 80-90, 119-126.
145. 157 CONG. REC. H2,505-07 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2011).
146. See S. 231, 112th Cong. (2011).
147. See S. 231-EPA Stationary Source Regulations Suspension Act, OPENCONGRESS,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-s231/show (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
56 [Vol. 1:1
Deregulatory Riders Redux
2. Amending or Repealing the Dodd-Frank Act.
For many years prior to the September 2008 financial meltdown,
Professor Elizabeth Warren had been urging Congress to create an inde-
pendent consumer financial protection agency to administer the consumer
protection laws applicable to the financial sector.148 If consumer safety
regulation made it impossible to purchase a toaster with a one-in-five
chance of bursting into flames, she wondered, how was it that a consumer
could refinance an existing home using a mortgage with a one-in-five
chance of "putting the family out on the street" through default without
even so much as a warning? 14 The answer was that "[c]redit products
... are regulated by a tattered patchwork of federal and state laws that have
failed to adapt to changing markets" and that have permitted financial
institutions to market products with "incomprehensible terms" and to
engage in "sharp practices that have left families at the mercy of those who
write the contracts.""0
President Obama spent his first 100 days in a frantic effort to stabilize
collapsing financial markets that he had inherited from the Bush admin-
istration. Rather than pressing ahead with comprehensive financial reform
legislation as a quid pro quo for the government bailout of Wall Street,
however, he decided to make health care reform his top domestic priority.
The administration did not produce a comprehensive plan for financial
reform until June 2009, when it released an eighty-eight-page "blueprint"
containing most, but not all of its ideas for legislation.1s' The administration
did not offer dramatic changes like breaking up "too-big-to-fail" financial
institutions.1 52 Rather, the proposal demonstrated a strong preference for
"technical solutions" to the problems raised by the financial crisis, and it
delegated many of the hardest decisions to the implementing agencies." 3
The one striking exception to the blueprint's otherwise rather modest
suggestions for government intervention was a recommendation that
Congress create a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) to
148. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8;
see also Jodi Kantor, Consumers' Champion Wages Her Own Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2010, at Al (describing Elizabeth Warren's passion for the consumer protection agency).
149. Warren, supra note 148, at 8.
150. Id. at 9.
151. See ROBERT KUTTNER, A PRESIDENCY IN PERIL 88-90, 116 (2010).
152. Id. at 89-90.
153. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 191 (2010); see also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Out of
the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A27. According to one seasoned observer, it was
"little more than an attempt to stick some new regulatory fingers into a very leaky financial
dam rather than rebuild the dam itself." Joe Nocera, A Financial Overhaul Plan, but Only a
Hint of Roosevelt, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at Al.
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regulate predatory lending practices of banks and mortgage companies and
to ensure that banks do not make loans to borrowers who cannot afford
154them. Drawing heavily upon Professor Warren's work, the proposal was
uncharacteristically specific. The agency was to be an independent commis-
sion. Its members were to be appointed for a term of years and not subject
to removal by the President except for cause.'s The sponsors hoped that
making the agency independent would shield it from political pressures
from the White House and powerful congresspersons, protect it from
capture by the industry, and provide some degree of institutional stability
as it carried out its primary mission of protecting consumers from fraudulent
and abusive lending practices.15 6
Consumer groups strongly supported the administration's proposal to
create a new CFPA.s7 They pointed to the obvious conflict of interest on
the part of the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, which were responsible
both for the safety and soundness of the institutions they regulated and for
administering consumer protection laws that, if adequately implemented,
would increase costs and thereby potentially threaten the safety and sound-
ness of those institutions. 158 The business community just as strongly
objected to the idea of creating a new agency to protect consumers from
predatory lending.s' The Chamber of Commerce launched an advertising
campaign to "Stop the CFPA."6 o
The new agency appeared doomed to certain Senate filibuster until its
sponsors agreed to a suggestion by Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) to house
it in the Federal Reserve.' 6 ' The sponsors insisted, however, that the agen-
cy's director not be subject to direction from the Federal Reserve or to
removal by the President except for good cause. 162 They also attempted to
enhance independence of the new agency, now called the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau (CFPB), by funding it from monies collected by the
Federal Reserve from the banks it regulated in amounts to be determined by
154. See JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 153, at 198; KUTTNER, supra note 151, at 94-98;
Binyamin Appelbaum & David Cho, Obama Blueprint Deepens Federal Role in Markets,
WASH. POST, June 17, 2009, at Al.
155. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REv. 15, 72 (2010).
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Appelbaum & Cho, supra note 154.
159. Barkow, supra note 155, at 73.
160. Id. at 74.
161. See Damian Paletta, Fight over Consumer Agency Looms as Overhaul Is Signed, WALL
ST. J., July 22, 2010, at Al.
162. See Barkow, supra note 155, at 74.
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the head of the agency.' The sponsors also agreed to some special interest
exemptions for auto dealers and small banks with less than $10 billion in
assets. 64
a. The Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010,165 which Congress passed in July 2010, was one of the most popular
bills enacted during the first two years of the Obama administration. The
statute created the quasi-independent CFPB under the Federal Reserve
Board. The CFPB was to be headed by a Director, appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, who was to serve a
five-year term and could be fired only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office."'66 The CFPB's funding for the first three years was
to come from the Federal Reserve's fees on banks in an amount determined
by the Director "to be reasonably necessary" to carry out its authorities. 167
The Federal Reserve was prohibited from "interven[ing] in any matter or
proceeding before the Director," appointing, directing, or removing any
CFPB employee, or merging CFPB with any other office of the Federal
Reserve. 68 The Act also gave the agency a degree of political independence
by allowing the Director and agency officers to testify before Congress
without obtaining approval from the Federal Reserve or the White
House.169 Finally, the Act gave CFPB the authority to bring civil actions
directly in federal court without seeking approval from the Department of
Justice.170
The new agency's primary statutory goals were to ensure that "consum-
ers are provided with timely and understandable information to make
responsible decisions about financial transactions" and to protect consumers
from "unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices."' 7' At the same time,
CFPB was to ensure that "outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome
regulations are regularly identified and addressed in order to reduce unwar-
ranted regulatory burdens."172 Other goals of the statute were to ensure
163. See id. at 77.
164. See Paletta, supra note 161.
165. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
166. Id. § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964.
167. Id. § 1017, 124 Stat. at 1975.
168. Id. § 1012(c), 124 Stat. at 1965.
169. Id. § 1012(c)(4), 124 Stat. at 1965.
170. See id. § 1054, 124 Stat. at 2028.
171. Id. § 1021(b)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. at 1980; see also id. § 1031(c)-(d), 124 Stat. at 2006
(defining "unfair" and "abusive").
172. Id. § 1021(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1980; see also id. § 1027, 124 Stat. at 1995 (excluding
entities Congress did not intend to cover).
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federal consumer financial protection laws were enforced consistently across
various sectors of the banking industry, and to make consumer financial
service markets transparent and efficient so as to "facilitate access and
innovation.""' The Dodd-Frank Act empowered CFPB to write rules,
regulations, and procedures to achieve these goals.' 74
CFPB had exclusive rule-making authority under the new statute and
the older consumer financial protection statutes that the statute assigned
to CFPB for implementation. The Act instructed the courts to defer to
CFPB's interpretation of the earlier consumer protection statutes, not
to the agencies that formerly implemented them.'7s Rules promulgated by
the CFPB, however, were subject to review by a new fifteen-member
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) that included the Treasury
Secretary, the Federal Reserve Chairman, and an "independent" member
with expertise in insurance.176 The FSOC could overrule a CFPB regula-
tion if a two-thirds majority of its ten voting members concluded that it
might endanger the safety and soundness of the banks to which it applied."'
In addition, any member of the FSOC was empowered to stay any CFPB
regulation for ninety days. 7 8
b. Industry Reaction
The ink was barely dry on the Dodd-Frank Act when the banking in-
dustry began to complain that it went too far. Before the first regulation
was promulgated, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce announced that the new
law would generate a "regulatory tsunami" that would hobble the American
economy.'79 The industry predicted that it would cost billions of dollars to
comply with the statute's requirements and that many companies would
173. Id. § 1021(b)(4)(5), 124 Stat. at 1980.
174. Id. § 1031(b), 124 Stat. at 2007. The statute empowered CFPB to write regulations
requiring lenders to disclose relevant information about the terms and conditions imposed
by lending instruments and to prepare model disclosures for covered entities to use in
consumer financial transactions, as well as make information available electronically. Id.
§§ 1032-33, 124 Stat. at 2006. CFPB must also establish a procedure for consumers to file
complaints and to follow up on those complaints with the relevant covered entities. Id.
§ 1034, 124 Stat. at 2008.
175. Id. § 1022, 124 Stat. at 1980.
176. Id. §§ 111, 1023, 124 Stat. at 1392, 1985.
177. Id. § 1023(c), 124 Stat. at 1985.
178. Id.
179. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Highlights Regulatory
Tsunami to Follow Financial Reform Bill (June 28, 2010), available at http://www.
uschamber.com/press/releases/2010/june/us-chamber-highlights-regulatory-tsunami-follow-
financial-reform-bill.
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simply relocate overseas to avoid the burden.8 o Less than three months
after enactment, the financial services industry had come up with a battle
plan to roll back some of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions, beginning with
the new CFPB.''
According to a Chamber spokesperson, it was important to "fix things
that just don't work in the legislation,"182 a curious position to take before
the regulations implementing the provisions under attack had even been
finalized. Another Chamber of Commerce spokesperson unconvincingly
protested that "[w]e're not trying to hurt the thing. We're trying to im-
prove it."'8 The head of the powerful Financial Services Roundtable, an
organization composed of the CEOs of 100 of the nation's largest financial
services institutions, vowed to "reform the reform."184
It was not difficult to persuade the new House leadership to take up
measures to reform the CFPB reforms. Before President Obama had
signed the Dodd-Frank bill, then-Minority Leader Boehner told reporters
that he thought the statute should be repealed.85 Senator Richard Shelby
(R-Ala.), the ranking minority member of the Senate Banking Committee,
agreed, focusing his complaints specifically on the new CFPB.'8 6 Every
Republican incumbent in the House had voted against the original bill.
When a large freshmen class of Republican congresspersons committed to
reducing the role of government regulation in the economy entered office
in January 2011, any deregulatory measures aimed at the CFPB were guar-
anteed smooth sailing through the House of Representatives. 8 8
180. Ben Protess, The Financial Overhaul Has Its Defender in Chief, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2011, at BS. See generally The Costs of Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011).
181. See Susanne Craig & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Regulatory Pregame: Laying Bets, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at Fl; Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.
nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit crisis/financial regulatory reform/
index.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2011).
182. Maya Jackson Randall & Jessica Holzer, Dodd-Frank Foes Adopt New Tactics, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2011, 6:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487040136045
76248982186837122.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Eileen Ambrose, Foes Trying to Chip Away at New Agency for Consumers, BALT.
SUN, May 8, 2011, at Cl (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Ben Protess, Leading the Wall Street Lobby, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at B1 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
185. Sean Lengell, Boehner Calls for Repeal of Wall Street Reform Bill, WASH. TIMES
(July 15, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/15/boehner-repeal-wall-
street-reform-bill/.
186. Dave Clarke & Rachelle Younglai, Key Senator Wants to Reopen Wall Street Bill,
REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/20/us-washington-
summit- regulation -idUSTRE68J49920100920.
187. See 155 CONG. REC. H14,804 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009).
188. See Editorial, Who Will Rescue Financial Reform?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A26.
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Any effort to dismantle the new CFPB would run directly counter to
public opinion, which strongly supported the new agency. A poll taken near
the first anniversary of the statute's enactment reported that seventy-four
percent of those surveyed supported the new agency.'8 9 But supporters of
rollbacks or repeal undoubtedly had strong ideological reasons for pressing
ahead, even in the face of contrary public opinion. The prospect of large
campaign contributions from a financial services industry that was once
again flush with resources after the 2009 federal bailout probably played a
powerful role as well. During the first quarter of 2011, seven of the ten
Republican freshmen on the House Financial Services Committee received
about forty percent of their campaign contributions from the financial
services industry alone.190
c. Attempts to Amend and Repeal
By the first anniversary of the statute's enactment, two dozen bills to
roll back or repeal the Dodd-Frank Act were pending in Congress. Not
surprisingly, CFPB was the target of many of these bills. In early January
2011, Representative Michele Bachmann (R-Minn.), a Tea Party leader and
future presidential candidate, introduced a bill that would have repealed the
Dodd-Frank Act.192 Senator Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) introduced a companion
Dodd-Frank Repeal Act in the Senate.9 Two bills introduced by Repre-
sentative Randy Neugebauer (R-Tex.) would have transferred CFPB to the
Treasury Department, where it would no longer have independent status.194
Since it would no longer be the beneficiary of the Federal Reserve's
funding, it would also be subject to limitation riders.19s Representative Bill
Posey (R-Fla.) introduced a similar bill that would have subjected CFPB to
annual appropriations.1 96 Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.), one of
the authors of the Dodd-Frank Act, complained that the banking industry
189. Jim Puzzanghera, Fight Over Watchdog Continues, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at B1.
190. Gary Rivlin, The Billion-Dollar Bank Heist, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 2011, at 9, 11.
191. Protess, supra note 180; Edward Wyatt, Dodd-Frank Under Fire a Year Later, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2011, at B1.
192. H.R. 87, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Donovan Slack, Republicans Seek Repeal of
Financial Rules, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 7, 2011, at 1.
193. S. 712, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill was referred to the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, where it remained.
194. H.R. 1355, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 557, 112th Cong. (2011).
195. H.R. 1355, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 557, 112th Cong. (2011).
196. H.R. 1640, 112th Cong. (2011). Both Neugebauer bills and the Posey bill were
referred to the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House
Financial Services Committee, and remained there.
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and its Republican allies were pursuing a strategy of "death by a thousand
cuts."197
The bills that received the most serious consideration went directly to
the heart of the Dodd-Frank Act's consumer protection program. A bill
introduced by Representative Spencer Bachus (R-Ala.) and Senator Jerry
Moran (R-Kan.) would have replaced CFPB's single Director with a
five-member commission composed of the Vice Chairman for Supervision
of the Federal Reserve System and four members appointed by the
President.'" A bill introduced by Representative Sean Duffy (R-Wis.)
would have allowed the FSOC to veto CFPB rules with a majority (rather
than two-thirds) vote, and it would have empowered the Chairperson of the
FSOC to issue a stay of any rule pending the vote. 99 It would also have
required (rather than authorized) the FSOC to set aside any CFPB regula-
tion that would put the safety and soundness of the United States banking
system or the stability of the United States financial system at risk.200 A bill
offered by Representative Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) would have
delayed the Dodd-Frank Act's transfer of regulatory authority over the
older consumer financial protection statutes to the CFPB until a CFPB
201Director was confirmed by the Senate.
The Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of
the House Financial Services Committee held two hearings on the CFPB.
The first featured a single witness: Elizabeth Warren, by that time an assis-
tant to the Secretary of the Treasury and aide to President Obama charged
with responsibility for setting up the new CFPB.202 Warren opposed the
bills as attempts "to chip away at [CFPB's] independence."203 The second
hearing focused on three of the prominent CFPB reform bills and featured
eight witnesses. Four presidents of financial institutions, the head of the
197. Slack, supra note 192 (internal quotation marks omitted). Other amendments to
the Dodd-Frank Act also received serious consideration in the House. See, e.g., H.R. REP.
No. 112-196, 112th Cong. (2011) (House Financial Services Committee report in favor of
repealing a portion of the Dodd-Frank Act regarding credit ratings); David S. Hilzenrath,
House Panel Defers Overhaul Action, WASH. POST, May 5, 2011, at A17 (discussing House
Agricultural Committee vote in favor of bill to delay implementation of derivatives rules by
eighteen months).
198. S. 737, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1121, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Ambrose, supra
note 183; Cheyenne Hopkins, Political Sniping Dominates House Hearing on the CFPB, Am.
BANKER, Apr. 7, 2011, at 3.
199. H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011).
200. Id.
201. H.R. 1667, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Ambrose, supra note 183; Hopkins, supra
note 198.
202. See Oversight of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. v (2011).
203. Katrina vanden Heuvel, Elizabeth Warren's Battle, NATION (Feb. 22, 2001, 12:31
PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/158780/elizabeth-warrens-battle.
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Consumer Bankers Association, and the executive director of the Center for
Capital Markets Competitiveness of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce all
testified in favor of one or more of the proposals.204 Only a witness repre
senting the NAACP and a Georgetown University law professor testified
against the proposals.2 05 The Bachus, Duffy, and Capito bills were then
marked up and reported out of committee. 206 In late July 2011, the full
House passed a single bill combining the contents of the three bills. 207 That
bill would have turned CFPB into a multi-member agency, made it easier
for the FSOC to veto its rules, and delayed the transfer of power to the
new agency until its members were confirmed.208
B. Deregulation Through Riders
Recognizing that it would be difficult to persuade the Democrat-
controlled Senate to enact deauthorizing legislation, and conscious of
President Obama's threat to veto such legislation, the House Republican
leadership pursued a simultaneous strategy of attaching environmental and
CFPB limitation riders to must-pass legislation.2 09 One major difference
between the battles over riders in the 112th Congress and those of the 104th
Congress was the virtual absence of moderate Republicans in either house
of Congress in 2011.210 By 2010, the conservatives and the Tea Party had
effectively purged the Republican Party of moderates who might have
voted against the leadership on environmental issues.
1. The 2011 Continuing Resolution
The first opportunity for the rider strategy came in mid-February 2011
as Congress took up a continuing resolution to fund the government. Be-
cause the 111th Congress had adjourned without passing a FY 2011 budget,
a continuing resolution was necessary to keep the government's doors open
204. Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Cong. (2011).
205. Id. at 14-16 (testimony of Hilary 0. Shelton, Director, NAACP Washington
Bureau, and Senior Vice President for Advocacy and Policy, NAACP); id. at 47-49 (testi-
mony of Adam J. Levitin, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center).
206. H.R. REP. No. 112-107 (2011); H.R. REP. No. 112-93 (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 112-
89 (2011).
207. 157 CONG. REC. HS,347-48 (daily ed. July 21, 2011).
208. Id. at HS,317-48.
209. See Nick Juliano, Senate Democrats Vow to Drop EPA Policy Measures from FY11
Budget Bill, 32 Inside EPA (Inside Wash. Publishers) No. 8, at 3 (Feb. 25, 2011).
210. See Paul Starr, The Demise of the Moderate Republican, AM. PROSPECT, June 2011,
at 3, 3.
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for the remainder of the fiscal year.211 The continuing resolution, as intro-
duced, contained limitation riders preventing EPA from expending any
appropriated funds for the "purposes of enforcing or promulgating any
regulation," or from denying approval of a permit or state implementation
plan "because of the emissions of greenhouse gases due to concerns regard-
ing possible climate change." 212 It also prevented EPA from expending any
of the appropriated funds to "implement, administer, or enforce" a draft
CWA guidance document expanding the scope of the definition of "wet-
lands."213 According to a former member of the House Budget Committee
Staff, it was d6jB vu all over again. 214 The full House added a long list of
deregulatory limitation riders to the Committee's bill, including the follow-
ing riders prohibiting EPA from using appropriated funds to:
establish numeric quality criteria for nutrients in Florida surface
waters to protect the Everglades (offered by Representative
Tom Rooney (R-Fla.));215
implement or enforce any policy giving closer scrutiny to CWA
permits for mountaintop removal mining operations (offered by
Representative Morgan Griffith (R-Va.)); 216
classify coal ash as a hazardous waste, or to veto any dredge-and-
fill permit issued by the Corps of Engineers (offered by Repre-
sentative David McKinley (R-W.Va.)); 217
promulgate Maximum Daily Loads under the CWA for a num-
ber of pollutants in the Chesapeake Bay (offered by
Representative Robert Goodlatte (R-Va.)); 218
211. See id.
212. H.R. 1, 112th Cong. § 1746 (as introduced in House, Feb. 11, 2011).
213. Id. § 1747; see also Juliano, supra note 209, at 4. The expanded definition would
have subjected more land to the CWA's permit requirement for filling wetlands with soil.
See EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters
Protected by the Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,479 (May 2, 2011); ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, DRAFT GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN WATER
ACT 2-3 (2011), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/wous
guidance_4-2011.pdf.
214. Juliano, supra note 209, at 4.
215. See 157 CONG. REC. H1,290-91, H1,305-06 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011).
216. Id. at H1,312-14, H1,332; see also Alan Kovski, EPA Effort to Improve Stream
Protections Seen as Slowing, Not Blocking Mine Permits, 41 Env't Rep. (BNA) 329 (Feb. 12,
2010) (describing the targeted policy); Janice Valverde, Army Corps Plan Would Ban Permit or
Mountaintop Mining in Appalachia, 40 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1444 (June 19, 2009) (detailing
stricter scrutiny of mining permits).
217. 157 CONG. REC. H1,318-20, H1,336 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011).
218. Id. at H1,282-84, H1,304.
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revise the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for coarse
particulate matter (offered by Representative Kristi Noem (R-
S.D.));219 and
enforce its hazardous air pollutant emissions standard for ce-
ment plants (offered by Representative John Carter (R-
Tex.)).220
An environmental activist noted that the riders were inconsistent with the
Republican "Pledge to America" manifesto from the 2010 elections. That
document had committed the candidates to "end[ing] the practice of pack-
aging unpopular bills with 'must-pass' legislation" and to "advanc[ing]
major legislation one issue at a time."22'
Throughout the House committee and floor debates, President Obama
remained curiously silent about the proposed anti-environmental riders. He
rarely mentioned global warming in his energy addresses during this time,
focusing instead on green technologies, "clean coal," domestic oil and gas
production, and nuclear power development. 222 With the White House on
the sidelines, the showdown came in the Senate. As the clock wound down
toward a government shutdown, the environmental riders became a major
sticking point in the negotiations over the bill.2 23 At the last possible
moment, the House leadership agreed to drop the environmental riders
from the bill.224 The leadership was apparently willing to abandon this early
opportunity to force the deregulatory rider issue in furtherance of a broader
strategy of adding deregulatory riders at every opportunity and hoping
that, as during the Clinton years, the opposition would diminish over time.
In the case of CFPB, the rider strategy could not consist of the tried-
and-true limitation rider prohibiting the federal agency from expending
appropriated monies to perform the targeted function. The supporters of
CFPB in the 111th Congress had anticipated such a move and had insulated
the agency against it by providing that its funding would come from the
monies that the Federal Reserve collected from the banking industry in
various fees. The House Republicans were, however, successful in includ-
ing a provision subjecting CFPB to annual audits by the Government
219. Id. at H1,325-27, H1,339.
220. Id. at H1,11S-21, H1,142.
221. REPUBLICANS IN CONG., A PLEDGE TO AMERICA 33 (2010) [hereinafter A
PLEDGE TO AMERICA], available at http://www.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/pledge/
a-pledge-to-america.pdf
222. John M. Broder, House Panel Votes to Strip E.P.A. of Power to Regulate Greenhouse
Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at A18.
223. See Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Riders Are Out of Spending Bill, but Analysts Say Battle Is
Far from Over, 42 Env't Rep. (BNA) 816 (Apr. 15, 2011).
224. See id.
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Accountability Office and private-sector auditors to assess the agency's
impact on jobs and the adequacy of its cost-benefit analyses.225
2. The SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011
The next move came in the Senate, where Republicans and some oil-
patch Democrats attempted to take away EPA's greenhouse gas regulatory
authority by attaching the text of the Inhofe and Rockefeller bills to the
reauthorization act for the Small Business Innovation Research and Small
Business Technology Transfer programs.22 6 The sponsors hoped that adding
the riders to this highly popular bill would insure against a presidential
veto. The full Senate, however, rejected both amendments in a fifty-fifty
vote in which one Republican joined the Democrats and four Democrats
joined the Republicans. 227 The Senate also rejected an amendment offered
by Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) that would have suspended EPA's
enforcement of its greenhouse gas regulations for two years, and an
amendment offered by Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.) that would have
exempted the agricultural sector and limited EPA's regulation to the very
largest power plants. 228 The Republicans voted against these amendments
because they were not sufficiently limiting. Nonetheless, Senator Bill
Nelson (D-Fla.), another Democrat who supported rolling back EPA's
regulations, promised to look for other bills to which the riders could be
attached.22 The Republican opponents of EPA's climate change protections
were likewise undaunted.
3. The 2012 Appropriation Bills
The next available vehicle for deregulatory riders was the FY 2012 ap-
propriation bills. The FY 2012 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations Bill, reported out of the House Appropriations Committee
on July 7, 2011, contained several legislative riders related to CFPB. One
rider would have amended the Dodd-Frank Act to limit the amount of
money that the Federal Reserve could transfer to CFPB to $200 million, a
thirty-nine percent reduction from the amount that CFPB requested and a
seventy-one percent reduction from the amount that the Dodd-Frank Act
225. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-10, § 1573, 125 Stat. 38, 138 (2011); see also Cheyenne Hopkins, Budget Pact Includes
Audits of CFPB, Am. BANKER, Apr. 12, 2011, at 3.
226. SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 493, 112th Cong.; Ari Natter, Senate
Rejects Amendments Blocking EPA Climate Authority; Critics Vow Retry, 42 Env't Rep. (BNA)
737 (Apr. 8, 2011) (explaining the failed attempt to attach the greenhouse gas prohibition).
227. Natter, supra note 226.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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had originally authorized the Federal Reserve to transfer.230 A second legis-
lative rider would have amended the Dodd-Frank Act to make CFPB's
funding subject to the annual appropriations process beginning in FY 2013
rather than in FY 2015, as provided for in the statute.231 A third legislative
rider would have required CFPB to submit an "operating plan" to the
committee within sixty days of enactment detailing how the agency
planned to allocate its resources.232 Finally, the committee's report signaled
its amenability to further legislative riders as floor amendments with a
paragraph concluding that "a five-member commission is more suitable for
guiding the [CFPB] than a single director" and expressing its strong sup-
port for Representative Bachus's bill.233
The riders in the FY 2012 Department of Interior and EPA appropria-
tion bill were reported out of the House Appropriations Committee on a
strict party-line vote on July 12, 2011.234 The riders in the bill surpassed in
number and aggressiveness the notorious environmental riders of the 104th
Congress. 235 One legislative rider, for instance, prohibited EPA from doing
any of the following for one year following enactment: "propos[ing] or
promulgat[ing] any regulation regarding the emissions of greenhouse gases
from stationary sources to address climate change"; including any enforcea-
ble condition for greenhouse gases to address climate change in any permit
application submitted within one year of enactment; and issuing any legally
operative permit conditions regulating such emissions.236 Additionally, the
rider prohibited common law tort actions, including nuisance claims, based
on any actual or potential damage due to the contribution of greenhouse
gas emissions to climate change for one year following enactment.237 Addi-
tional substantive riders exempted pesticide applicators from the CWA's
discharge permit requirement23 -thereby overruling a court of appeals
opinion holding that permits were required 239 -and expedited air quality
permits for offshore oil and gas facilities and exempted them from appeals
to EPA's Environmental Appeals Board.240
230. H.R. REP. No. 112-136, at 8 (2011).
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 8-9.
234. See H.R. REP. No. 112-151, at 132 (2011).
235. Leslie Kaufman, House Republicans Try to Curb Environmental Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 2011, at A16.
236. H.R. 2584, 112th Cong. § 431 (2011). This was a legislative rider, in my view,
because it amended the statute itself and did not merely withhold appropriated funds for a
particular purpose.
237. Id. § 431(a)(4); H.R. REP. No. 112-151, at 116 (2011).
238. H.R. REP. NO. 112-151, at 136.
239. See Nat'l Cotton Council v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 940 (6th Cir. 2009).
240. H.R. REP. No. 112-151, at 138.
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The bill also contained a number of limitation riders, including
prohibitions on using appropriated funds for the following purposes:
preparing, proposing, or finalizing any regulations of "green-
house gas emissions from new motor vehicles and new motor
* n241
engines ;
implementing closer scrutiny of CWA permits for mountaintop
removal mining;242
finalizing or implementing proposed regulations requiring
stream buffers for mountaintop removal mining;24 3
identifying coal ash as a hazardous waste;24 4
expanding the definition of wetlands; 24 5
lowering ambient standards to within or below background
concentration levels;2 46
completing EPA's proposed rule setting air toxics emissions
standards for industrial boilers; 247
implementing or enforcing its hazardous air pollutant emissions
standards for Portland cement plants;248
finalizing its regulations governing thermal discharges under the
CWA; 249
writing numerical nutrient standards for bodies of water in
Florida; 2 50
modifying the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
coarse particulate matter;251
finalizing guidance on false or misleading pesticide labels; 252 or
241. Id. at 117.
242. H.R. 2584, 112th Cong. § 433 (2011).
243. See id. § 432.
244. Id. § 434.
245. Id. § 435.
246. H.R. REP. No. 112-151, at 60-61 (2011).
247. Id. at 70.
248. H.R. 2584, 112th Cong. § 448 (2011).
249. See id. § 436.
250. See id. § 452.
251. Id. § 454.
252. Id. § 460.
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requiring mandatory reporting of greenhouse gas emissions
253from manure management.
Representative Mike Simpson (R-Idaho) explained that the riders were
necessary because "[m]any of us think that the overregulation from E.P.A.
is at the heart of our stalled economy."254 Representative Norm Dicks
(D-Wash.) observed that it was "already like a wish list for polluters," and it
was "going to get worse on the floor."255 As of the August recess, the full
House had not completed its deliberations on the bill. President Obama
threatened to veto the bill if it contained anti- environmental riders, 256 but
that threat was no more credible than his threat to veto the FY 2011 contin-
uing resolution.
IV. THE RIDER AS A POLICYMAKING TOOL
Riders have been "a constant presence in the legislative landscape for
150 years."257 As a legislative tool, the rider is not inherently good or evil.258
Riders can be abused in ways that defeat democracy, but they also make it
possible for legislation having the support of a large majority of the nation-
al population to prevail over an obstructionist minority. Riders have been
employed by both Democrats and Republicans whether they are in the
majority or in the minority.259 Although riders have most frequently been
deployed at the behest of companies and trade associations to advance
narrow economic interests, they have also been effectively utilized by public
interest groups advancing their views of the broader public interest. While
environmental and consumer groups universally deplored the environmen-
tal and financial riders described above, for many years some of the same
groups supported a limitation rider to the appropriation bills for the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration prohibiting expenditures to
implement a program that would allow trucks from Mexico to serve desti-
nations in the interior of the United States. 260 This section will analyze
some of the benefits and costs of riders to society and to public perceptions
of the legitimacy of the legislative process.
253. H.R. REP. No. 112-151, at 116 (2011).
254. Kaufman, supra note 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).
255. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. See Despite Veto Threat, House Limits on EPA Policy May Survive Senate Debate, 32
Inside EPA (Inside Wash. Publishers) No. 30, at 1, 1, 24 (July 29, 2011).
257. Patlis, supra note 18, at 327.
258. See id. at 260 ("[Riders] are not a priori evil.").
259. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 637, 640; Paths, supra note 18, at 261.
260. See Paths, supra note 18, at 269. The rider played a major role in the litigation
leading to the Supreme Court's decision in Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752,
761-62 (2004).
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A. Benefits of Riders
The rider offers a convenient shortcut to avoid the normal path of
legislation, which can take a number of unexpected turns and wind up at a
dead end. Riders often address controversial issues of public policy for
which compromise is difficult and progress is possible only if the majority
prevails. Given the difficulties of enacting legislation in a highly polarized
political environment in which a supermajority in the Senate is ordinarily
required to enact controversial legislation, the rider can be the only way for
Congress to legislate at all in controversial areas.26 At the same time, riders
can be the only effective tool for Congress to terminate Executive Branch
initiatives that exceed delegated authority.262 A President who would be
happy to veto an attempt to rein in executive power may not be willing to
veto a critical appropriation bill or continuing resolution.2 6 3
B. Costs of Riders
Despite these advantages, it is fair to conclude that riders are not a
favored method of pubic policymaking in a representative democracy.264
Scholars have identified several serious disadvantages of legislating through
riders. Because the process of adding riders to appropriation bills and other
must-pass legislation is often clouded in secrecy, it is difficult for citizens
who are adversely affected by riders to hold their elected representatives
accountable for supporting them. Riders often allow determined special
interest groups to have their way without the full public participation and
deliberation promised by our republican form of government.26 The com-
mittees that are often responsible for adding riders to bills lack the subject
matter expertise that the bypassed authorization committees possess. The
motivating forces behind most riders are special interests seeking special
advantages at the expense of the general population. Finally, and in my
view most importantly, special interests and their allies in Congress can use
riders to extort concessions out of the Executive Branch that can debilitate
261. See Devins, supra note 13, at 464.
262. See id.
263. See id. It should be noted, however, that the Constitution does provide a vehicle
for Congress to override presidential vetoes with a two-thirds vote in each house. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7. The rider is a vehicle for avoiding this hurdle.
264. See Lazarus, supra note 122, at 36. See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 63-79 (1992); Devins, supra note 13.
265. See Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The Fairness
Doctrine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation, 76 GEO. L.J. 59, 112 (1987)
("[A]ppropriation riders are frequently not the product of legislative deliberation and
consensus."); Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and
the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 283-84 (1996).
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new and ongoing regulatory programs to the detriment of the public
welfare.
1. Transparency and Accountability
The process of adding riders to appropriation bills and other must-pass
legislation is not especially transparent under the best of conditions, and it
can be downright secretive at times. In the case of deregulatory riders that
reduce the protections provided by popular consumer and environmental
legislation, the sponsors of riders are especially anxious to hide them in
1,000-page consolidated appropriation bills where they become visible, if at
all, after it is too late for opponents to sound a public alarm.266 For exam-
ple, parts of the salvage timber rider in the 1995 rescissions bill that
emerged from the House Appropriations Committee were handwritten,
and the final version was still unavailable at the time the full House voted
on the bill.267
Citizens affected by the substantive changes imposed by riders that are
hidden from public view find it difficult to hold members of Congress
accountable for the practical consequences of their votes.268 When citizens
do learn of riders after the fact, members of Congress can avoid accounta-
bility by claiming that their hands were tied by the need to enact must-pass
legislation.
Lack of transparency and accountability, however, was not a problem
that afflicted the environmental and worker safety riders to the FY 1996
appropriation bill that the House passed during the 104th Congress. As we
have seen, the contents of those riders were widely publicized in the press
and highlighted by President Clinton, who detected from opinion polls that
challenging the riders would be a wise political move. Likewise, the envi-
ronmental riders that were added to the FY 2011 rescissions bill and EPA's
2012 appropriation bill were widely publicized in the mainstream press and
well known to environmental groups who vigorously opposed them. The
more technical riders to the FY 2012 appropriation bill aimed at disempow-
ering the CFPB were slightly less visible, but nevertheless received enough
media attention to make consumer groups well aware of them and to hold
their representatives accountable for voting for them. 269 The partisan
266. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 660; see also Sunstein, supra note 265, at 283-84 (criticiz-
ing the House of Representatives for reducing environmental regulation through the
"relatively less visible mechanism" of appropriation riders).
267. Goldman & Boyles, supra note 66, at 1043-44.
268. See Zellmer, supra note 54, at 510.
269. For an example of such media attention, see Peter Schroeder, GOP Targets Funding
of Consumer Bureau, HILL (June 15, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-
money/appropriations/166531-gop-sets-sights-on-consumer-bureau-in-latest-approps-bill.
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proponents of these riders did not want to hide the changes from the pub-
lic. To the contrary, they apparently wanted their supporters to know that
they opposed the regulatory programs that EPA and CFPB were imple-
menting under existing statutory authority and that they were prepared to
do something about it.
2. Lack of Due Deliberation
Perhaps the most frequently expressed complaint about appropriations
riders is that they allow Congress to push through legislation without the
due deliberation that should attend the serious enterprise of legislating
substantive law.270 Since the Civil War, both houses of Congress have at-
tempted to ensure that substantive legislation receives the deliberation that
the public rightly expects. 27' They have divided the labor of preparing bills
for full consideration between the authorization committees -responsible
for considering substantive legislation creating, modifying, or eliminating
federal programs-and the budget and appropriations committees respon-
sible for funding authorized programs. 272 The very existence of riders is
inconsistent with this arrangement, a point that is nominally captured in
the rules of both houses of Congress. The relevant Senate rule allows a
Senator to raise a point of order with respect to any amendment to an
appropriation bill that "proposes general legislation,"273 and the House rule
provides that a "provision changing existing law may not be reported in a
general appropriation bill."274 The rules have been interpreted, however, to
exclude limitation riders, which arguably do not change law and are
applicable for only a single fiscal year.275 Even with respect to legislative
riders, the rules are often flouted when the rules committees of both houses
liberally issue waivers for riders the leadership prefers and deny waivers for
riders the leadership opposes.276
Authorization committees generally proceed in a far more deliberative
fashion when considering substantive legislation than the appropriations
committees proceed when considering appropriation riders. Authorizing
270. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 13 at 464-65; Goldman & Boyles, supra note 66, at
1036-37; Lazarus, supra note 11, at 632-33; Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the Use of
Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 457, 474 (1992); Zellmer, supra note 54, at 503-04.
271. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 633.
272. See id. But see Zellmer, supra note 54, at 505-07 (noting the division of labor is
often not followed).
273. STANDING RULES OF THE U.S. SENATE, S. Doc. No. 110-9, R. XVI(4) (2007).
274. CLERK OF THE H.R., 112TH CONG., RULES OF THE H.R. r. XXI(2)(b) (2011),
available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf.
275. See Devins, supra note 13, at 462.
276. See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 676; Zellmer, supra note 54, at 506-07.
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committees typically hold one or more hearings on a substantive bill at
which witnesses can testify for and against the bill, offering information
and arguments in support of their positions.277 In the case of legislation
affecting particular regulatory programs, the list of witnesses invariably
includes a representative of the affected agency, who is given an opportunity
to defend the program and is available to be quizzed by skeptical members
of the committee.278 In addition, the witness list typically includes repre
sentatives of the affected industry and consumer or environmental groups
who can also present information and arguments for and against changing
the existing law.
When an appropriations committee reports out a bill that is laden with
substantive riders, it effectively usurps the authority of the authorization
committees and pretermits the substantive legislation -writing process
under the House and Senate rules. 27 Appropriations committees under-
standably expend most of their deliberative efforts on agency budget
justifications and matters of fiscal policy. They rarely take testimony on
riders that they attach to appropriation bills, and they seldom debate them
at any length during markup sessions.280 The absence of due deliberation is
especially troubling for deregulatory riders that operate to change existing
law. They are of great concern to the regulatory beneficiaries because the
process allows rider proponents to bring to the floor legislation that might
never have emerged from the relevant authorization committees over the
objections of regulatory-program proponents.28' When riders are attached
to must-pass legislation that faces a looming deadline, as is nearly always
the case with riders to continuing resolutions, the relevant authorization
committees may not even have time to read and digest the riders' content
before being required to vote on them.2 82
Floor riders added to appropriation bills and other must-pass legisla-
tion also circumvent the carefully designed deliberative process envisioned
by the House and Senate rules, even if the legislation to which they are
attached has undergone hearings and markup. The floor debates over
appropriation bills tend to be quite limited, especially in the House of
Representatives. 283 For example, the OSHA ergonomics appropriation
277. Zellmer, supra note 54, at 500-01.
278. In contrast, appropriation riders "are often added as last minute measures, not by
legislative committees responsible for and experienced in substantive legislation, but rather
by appropriations committees that generally lack both substantive expertise and the benefit
of hearings and committee reports, and then passed by the Congress with little or no de-
bate." Bloch, supra note 265, at 112.
279. See Goldman & Boyles, supra note 66, at 1043; Zellmer, supra note 54, at 505.
280. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 655.
281. See Zellmer, supra note 54, at 457.
282. Id. at 507-08.
283. See Sunstein, supra note 265, at 284-85.
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rider in the 104th Congress had a profound impact on one of the most
important rule-making initiatives in that agency's history. Yet the OSHA
rulemaking barely surfaced in the vigorous substantive debates over Medi-
care and other expensive federal programs that absorbed the bulk of the
members' attention during the floor consideration of the appropriation bill.
While the deliberation critique of riders is well taken as a general
matter, it is only marginally relevant to the deregulatory riders examined in
this Article. The House leadership in both the 104th and 112th Congresses
adopted a strategy of moving stand-alone bills rapidly through the authori-
zation committees so that the work product of those committees could be
used as templates for riders to appropriation bills. Thus, most of the riders
examined here were the subjects of hearings before the relevant authoriza-
tion committees, and many were voted on and reported out of committee
before being attached as riders to continuing resolutions or appropriation
bills. The amendments to the CWA that showed up in the House-passed
FY 1996 appropriation bill had already been reported out of the relevant
authorization committee. At the same time that Tom Delay was insisting on
a rider to prevent OSHA from issuing an ergonomics standard, the House
Economic and Educational Opportunities Committee was conducting
extensive hearings on amendments that would have put an end to that rule-
making initiative and many others. Similarly, the climate change rider to
the House version of EPA's FY 2012 appropriation bill had already been
the subject of hearings before the relevant authorization committee. The
same was true for changes to the Dodd-Frank Act that showed up as riders
to the FY 2012 appropriation bill for the Treasury Department.
This is not to say that all of the aforementioned riders received the
deliberation that was due. As we have seen, the House hearings on climate
change and CFPB bills during the 112th Congress featured many witnesses
favoring the deregulatory policies advanced by the legislation and very few
witnesses representing the beneficiaries of the targeted regulatory pro-
grams. All of the bills would no doubt have benefitted from fuller and fairer
hearings. But the fact remains that the committees aired at least two sides
of the relevant issues in a public forum that complied with the due deliber-
ation requirements of both houses of Congress. And the bills reflected that
deliberation after they were added as riders to continuing resolutions and
appropriation bills.
This suggests that in these highly polarized times, the value of deliber-
ation may be overrated. Pro forma hearings in which agency heads are
pummeled with rhetorical questions and demands for information are not
paradigms of democratic deliberation. The riders that were attached to the
FY 2012 appropriation bills received about as much deliberation as they
were going to receive in the authorization committees before moving to the
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floor of the House. Furthermore, the relevant Senate committees, which
were controlled by the Democratic Party, were free to hold additional hear-
ings on the subject matter of the House bills, most of which had companion
bills pending in the Senate. When applied to the deregulatory riders stud-
ied here, the deliberation critique strikes a glancing blow at best.
3. Lack of Expertise
A primary reason for dividing legislative committees along functional
lines according to subject matter is to ensure that proposed legislation is
284
reviewed by committees with expertise in the relevant subject matter.
Over time, the members and the staff of the authorizing committees ac-
quire expertise in the relevant body of law and in the way that the
designated agency is implementing and enforcing that law. The authoriza-
tion committees also gain a sense of how difficult it is to establish new
programs and of how disruptive sudden changes to ongoing programs can
be for the agencies, the regulated industries, and the beneficiaries of those
programs. The fact that the authorizing committee can bring its expertise
to bear on the substance of proposed legislation should help ensure a
sounder legislative product.285
Appropriations committees generally lack the authorizing committees'
expertise regarding the nature and operation of the regulatory programs. 2 86
To be sure, appropriations subcommittee members and staff must have
some familiarity with ongoing programs to make considered judgments
about how much money to appropriate. Since they are primarily concerned
with budgetary matters, however, they are generally not as familiar with the
substance of programs that are the targets of deregulatory riders as are the
members and staffs of the authorizing committees. Moreover, as the keep-
ers of the government fisc, they are likely to be more favorably inclined
toward deregulatory riders that reduce the scope of regulatory programs
and thereby reduce the cost of running those programs than authorizing
committees, which may be more inclined to expand the reach of the agen-
cies that they oversee. Authorizing committee members may bring their
expertise to bear on proposed riders to appropriation bills or other must-
pass legislation when they are introduced and debated on the floor of the
House or Senate. Even then, however, such riders do not necessarily
receive the full benefit of the expertise of the authorization committee
284. See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 655; Zellmer, supra note 54, at 501-02.
285. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 653-55; Zellmer, supra note 54, at 501.
286. See Devins, supra note 13, at 458 (noting that appropriation riders "may prevent
the appropriate authorizing committee from applying its expertise"); Lazarus, supra note 11,
at 654 ("[T]here is no reason to suppose that the two different kinds of committees possess
remotely similar degrees of relevant policy expertise in the substantive details . . . .").
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members because the riders are usually taken up in rapid succession with
little time allocated for serious study and debate.
Like the deliberation critique, the expertise critique is not fully appli-
cable to the deregulatory riders considered here. As discussed above, many
of the riders were referred to authorization committees in the House, and
most of those were reported out of those committees before being added as
riders to appropriation bills. Others were added by the appropriations
committees or were offered as floor amendments. Bills that have been fully
considered by authorization committees and attached as riders to must-pass
legislation do not necessarily suffer from lack of committee expertise.
4. Special Interest Pandering
As noted above, riders are available to proponents both of deregulation
and of more stringent regulation, but they have been employed far more
frequently by the former.287 Both during the Clinton years and in the 112th
Congress thus far, the House Republican leadership opened special chan-
nels of communication to business-community lobbyists that facilitated
industry efforts to enact both legislative and limitation riders. During the
104th Congress, for example, House Republican Conference Chairman
John Boehner met with corporate lobbyists, representatives of selected
think tanks, and grass roots groups every Thursday morning in the Speak-
er's office; there they coordinated their lobbying efforts with the
Republican leadership's deregulatory agenda. 28 8 At the outset of the 112th
Congress, the Financial Services Roundtable hosted a gathering of congres-
sional staffers that it called "Financial Services University," at which "visiting
professors" gave lectures on the Dodd-Frank Act and its projected adverse
impacts on the banking industry.289 Soon thereafter, Representative Darryl
Issa (R-Cal.), Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform, invited members of the business community to submit
lists of regulations that, in their view, should be repealed or modified.290
287. See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 663-64.
288. See JOHN B. JUDIS, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 220 (2001); Jeffrey
H. Birnbaum, The Thursday Regulars, TIME, Mar. 27, 1995, at 30, 30-31.
289. Protess, supra note 184.
290. See H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & Gov'T REFORM, 112TH CONG., ASSESSING
REGULATORY IMPEDIMENTS TO JOB CREATION 7-8 (2011) [hereinafter ASSESSING
REGULATORY IMPEDIMENTS], available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/
Reports/Preliminary Staff Report Regulatory Impediments-to JobCreation.pdfA.pdf
(preliminary staff report); Press Release, Congressman Darrell Issa, Issa Makes Submissions
Reflecting Input from Job Creators on Regulatory Barriers to Job Creation Public (Feb. 7,
2011), available at http://issa.house.gov/index.php?option com content&task view&
id=620&Itemid=28&Itemid=4.
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Many of the resulting suggestions became riders to the FY 2012 EPA
appropriation bill in the House.291
Deregulatory riders invariably undermine the policies that Congress
meant to advance when it enacted the regulatory statutes. In the case of
limitation riders, the impact is temporary (unless Congress renews the
rider with each agency appropriation, as is frequently the case). Legislative
riders, however, change existing law through a process that rarely reflects
the full public input and congressional deliberation that attended the
enactment of the original statute. In both cases, the deregulatory rider is
nearly always intended to advance the economic interests of an industry, or
even a single company, at the expense of the beneficiaries of the statute.
The "rider game invite[s] special interests to use their influence to obtain
'get out of jail free cards' for violating [existing] laws and running afoul of
settled public policy."292 Deregulatory riders also tend to interfere with an
agency's ongoing efforts to implement the statute in a way that is fair to all
regulated entities.
5. Extortion
The most serious problem with the environmental and OSHA riders of
the 104th Congress, and the environmental and CFPB riders of the 112th
Congress, was not the lack of transparency, the absence of congressional
hearings, the lack of expertise, or even the fact that they were advanced by
narrow economic interests. As with the spending riders attached to the debt
ceiling bill in the summer of 2011, the problem with these riders was extor-
tion. The proponents of the riders held appropriation bills and continuing
resolutions hostage to their demands for specific deregulatory policy chang-
es without persuading Congress and the President that such changes were
in the public interest. While these efforts made great strategic sense, they
are nevertheless troublesome from the broader perspective of lawmaking in
a representative democracy.
291. The industry responses included suggestions for a number of deregulatory chang-
es that found their way into the deregulatory riders, including changes eliminating or
limiting EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, mountaintop removal mining,
coal ash disposal, hazardous emissions from cement plants, and discharges of nutrients in the
Chesapeake Bay. See ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPEDIMENTS, supra note 290, at app. I.
292. Goldman & Boyles, supra note 66, at 1037. The salvage timber rider, for example,
"truncated the required environmental analysis, eliminated administrative appeals, and
rendered federal environmental and natural resources laws unenforceable" for entire catego-
ries of new timber sales, id. at 1048, and directed the relevant agencies "to proceed with a
category of old timber sales that had been canceled or held up because they violated federal
environmental laws," thereby undoing "past actions taken by the agencies and the courts to
comply with the law." Id. at 1051. This was all done at the behest of lumber companies and
unions bent on achieving short term profits at the expense of long term forest management
goals. Id. at 1043.
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Ordinarily, the pressure to enact, amend, or repeal authorizing legisla-
tion comes from lobbyists for affected interests who press Congress to act
or refrain from acting. Because inaction leaves the status quo in place, the
burden is on the proponents of legislative change to persuade the leader-
ship of both houses of Congress to move the legislation forward and to
persuade a majority of House members and (in the case of virtually all
controversial legislation) a supermajority of sixty senators to vote for the
bill.29 The opposite is true of appropriation legislation and legislation
raising the debt limit, both of which must be enacted periodically for the
government to function and to maintain the full faith and credit of the
United States.294 Determined proponents of special interest riders who are
positioned to stop or delay legislation in this latter category can hold legis-
lation hostage by threatening to exercise that power if it fails to include the
rider.
Because appropriations committees are responsible for funding the
federal government annually, they typically adhere to strict schedules to
ensure that the federal government does not shut down. 295 Strict schedules
also characterize legislation raising the debt ceiling and legislation reauthor-
izing existing programs. As the deadline nears, the legislative environment
can become quite conducive to attempts by proponents of special interests
to attach ill-considered riders to the bill.296 It can be very difficult for a
congressperson to vote against an appropriation bill, a continuing resolu-
tion, a bill raising the debt ceiling, or a bill reauthorizing an existing
program simply because a single rider is unfair or offensive. 297 The same is
true for the President's decision whether to veto such bills. Thus, a promise
to impede the progress of such a bill if it does not contain a favored rider
amounts to an extortionate threat to bring the federal government to a halt,
to refuse to pay the government's existing debts, or to end a popular gov-
ernment program if the rider does not pass. 298 The extortion is even clearer
in the case of a continuing resolution that must be passed quickly to avoid a
government shutdown. 299
Strategic use of riders allows a political party that controls a single
house of Congress to effectuate substantive policies that are actively
293. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 634-35.
294. See id. at 635.
295. See id.
296. See id. Delay is an option, but only if Congress is willing to pass a continuing
resolution to fund the relevant programs until it passes a full appropriation bill or to tempo-
rarily raise the debt ceiling. See Devins, supra note 13, at 469 & n.82.
297. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 661.
298. See Goldman & Boyles, supra note 66, at 1047-48 (explaining that some Senators
strongly objected to attaching the salvage timber rider to the 1995 rescissions bill, but voted
for it anyway "because of the importance of deficit reduction").
299. See Zellmer, supra note 54, at 508.
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opposed by a majority of the members of the other house, the President,
and the general public. Such a strategy is effective so long as that party is
willing to risk that public opinion will turn against it if either the other
house or the President prevents enactment of the underlying "must-pass"
legislation. Congressional gerrymandering has created a large number of
"safe" congressional seats, however, and the risk that changed public opin-
ion at the national level will drive the occupant of a safe seat out of office is
often quite low.300 Although riders are not unconstitutional, such extortion
by a single house of Congress is certainly inconsistent with the notion of a
bicameral legislature. If one branch of the legislature can effectively extort
the other by attaching substantive riders to must-pass bills, the power of the
other branch in the law-making process has been greatly reduced. It also
limits the President's ability to exercise independent judgment concerning
the substantive policies effectuated by a rider3'0'
Finally, the 2011 debt ceiling fight has demonstrated that public respect
for the institution of Congress suffers when an uncompromising majority
in one house imposes its will on the majority of the other house and on the
President. It is one thing to engage in a serious debate over the meaning of
the public interest in the context of a pending bill to change substantive
law; it is quite another to impose a single view of the public interest on the
nation by threatening to shut down the government or blow up the national
economy. Public trust in Congress is currently at its lowest level since
approval polls have been taken, 302 in large part because of the spectacle of
the recent fight over riders to the debt ceiling bill. And there are strong
prospects for more of the same throughout the rest of the 112th Congress,
and perhaps beyond. The lack of public confidence in Congress's ability to
navigate the troubled waters in the wake of the second-worst economic
downturn in American history is more than a little disturbing.
V. SOLUTIONS
From the above discussion, it would appear that the disadvantages of
deregulatory riders far outweigh the advantages. Yet, while it is easy to
300. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV.
593, 622-26 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?:
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 570-74 (2004). With the
advent of the Tea Party, the risk of losing a "safe" seat is apparently greater to Republican
representatives. Republican representatives who decline to participate in the extortion may
find themselves "primaried" in the next election.
301. See Bloch, supra note 265, at 113 ("[T]he use of appropriation riders to enact
substantive provisions arguably undercuts the ability of the President to participate in the
policymaking process."); LeBoeuf, supra note 270, at 475.
302. Rosalind S. Helderman & Peyton M. Craighill, Capital Ill, WASH. POST, Aug. 11,
2011, at C1.
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identify good reasons to limit such riders or ban them altogether, it is far
more difficult to come up with effective ways to accomplish that end. For
example, one frequently-suggested solution to the rider problem is to give
the President the power to exercise a "line item" veto, thereby preventing
riders from going into effect.303 But the Supreme Court in 1998 held that a
general law giving the president line item veto authority was unconstitu-
tional.304 The statute at issue in that case empowered the President to
cancel an "item of new direct spending" and a "limited tax benefit,"30 s and
provided that such cancellation prevented the cancelled provision from
"having legal force or effect."o' The Court held that this action effectively
repealed the cancelled statutory provisions and, as such, constituted a unilat-
eral amendment of a statute by the President in violation of the Presentment
Clause, which requires both houses of Congress to pass legislation and then
present it to the President.3 07
Since both legislative and limitation riders are provisions of duly enact-
ed legislation, the Court would almost certainly find a narrow statute
permitting the president to cancel nongermane riders to suffer from the
same constitutional infirmity.
A. Constitutional Amendment
Congress could tie itself to the mast by passing legislation initiating the
process of amending the Constitution to prohibit nongermane riders. A
constitutional ban on riders would still leave open the question of who
would have standing to enforce the ban. Congress could partially solve that
problem by adding to the proposed amendment a line item presidential
veto. The amendment could automatically ban nongermane riders and allow
the President to exercise his or her discretion to enforce the ban. This
would at least allow an official with a national constituency to veto riders
that were generated by companies or trade associations advancing narrow
economic interests.30 s
Given the highly partisan atmosphere in Washington, D.C., a constitu-
tional amendment of any sort is highly unlikely, and an amendment that
empowers the President and disempowers lobbyists for special interests
who are also large campaign contributors is especially quixotic. Quite apart
from the political difficulties that proponents of such an amendment would
303. See Zellmer, supra note 54, at 511-12.
304. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998).
305. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (Supp. 11 1997), declared unconstitutional by Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998).
306. Id. § 691e(4)(B)-(C).
307. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421, 448-49.
308. See generally Zellmer, supra note 54, at 518-34.
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face in persuading members of Congress to vote for a measure that would
so clearly limit their discretion to please powerful constituents, the difficul-
ties that they would encounter in persuading the legislatures (or ratifying
conventions) of three-quarters of the states to ratify an amendment on such
a controversial topic would probably prove insurmountable.
B. Change the Rules
In a thoughtful article on environmental riders, Professor Richard
Lazarus suggests that Congress should put its house in order by enacting
legislation to discourage riders.30' Specifically, he suggests that the legisla-
tion should make it more difficult for the rules committees to grant waivers
from the already existing proscriptions on attaching legislative riders to
appropriation bills. 310 To ensure special interests do not attach riders
to other legislation like continuing resolutions, debt ceiling bills, and reau-
thorization bills, the legislation could go further to prohibit nongermane
riders to all forms of legislation.
A strict prohibition would, however, forego the benefits riders provide
in overcoming the effective sixty-vote majority required to pass controver-
sial legislation in the Senate and in limiting Executive Branch discretion.
One might conclude that the demonstrated disadvantages of riders are so
detrimental to the political system that eliminating riders is worth the
sacrifice. Alternatively, Congress could require a supermajority in either
house to add a nongermane rider to a bill.
In these highly partisan times, it may be difficult to enact legislation
limiting riders. They are clearly advantageous to the political party that
controls at least one house of Congress. The Republican Party made good
use of deregulatory riders during the Clinton years, and there is every
reason to expect that it will achieve at least some success in employing the
rider strategy in the 112th Congress.
Yet there are reasons to believe that the prospects for legislation limit-
ing riders may not be as unrealistic as efforts to pass a constitutional
amendment. During the 1990s and 2000s, Congress tolerated an extreme
form of logrolling called "earmarks," under which an appropriation bill or
the report accompanying the bill directs an executive branch agency to
expend appropriated funds on specific organizations or projects favored by
one or more members of Congress.3 1' Earmarks often circumvent statutes
or regulations articulating merit-based criteria for selecting the recipients
309. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 678-79.
310. Id.
311. See Cong. Research Serv., Memorandum, Earmarks in Appropriation Acts:
FY1994, FY1996, FY1998, FY2000, FY2002, FY2004, FY2005, at 2-3 (Jan. 26, 2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/m0l2606.pdf.
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of the funds.312 But in 2008, the House of Representatives and the Senate
adopted rules requiring sponsors of earmarks to provide specific infor-
mation concerning their purpose and recipients to the relevant authorizing
committee, which, in turn, was responsible for compiling lists of requested
earmarks and making them available to the public.31 3 In early 2010, the
House Republican caucus agreed to swear off all earmarks for both profit-
making and nonprofit entities.314 Immediately following the 2010 elections,
the caucus announced a policy that prohibited earmarks.' House leader-
ship then adopted a policy prohibiting earmarks for the 112th Congress.1
After President Obama announced that he would not sign a bill containing
earmarks, the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator
Daniel Inouye (D-Haw.), agreed to ban earmarks from appropriation bills
during the 112th Congress." The fact that the full House and the Senate
Appropriations Committee have placed limitations on earmarks suggests
that limitations on riders, which can be equally abusive, are not beyond the
realm of possibility.
C. Public Disapproval
As the national media shined a spotlight on earmarking in the late
2000s, it became painfully apparent to the public that the unsavory practice
advantaged tiny, favored constituencies at the expense of all taxpayers for
no good public policy reason. Public opinion across the political spectrum
ultimately turned strongly against the practice. 318
312. Id. at 29; see also Earmarks, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://earmarks.
omb.gov/earmarks-public/ (last updated Jun. 14, 2011) (providing access to earmarks from
recent years).
313. See generally MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22866,
EARMARK DISCLOSURE RULES IN THE HOUSE: MEMBER AND COMMITTEE REQUIREMENTS
(2008); MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS22867, EARMARK
DISCLOSURE RULES IN THE SENATE: MEMBER AND COMMITTEE REQUIREMENTS (2008).
314. Eric Lichtblau, New Earmark Rules Have Lobbyists Scrambling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2010, at A13.
315. Carl Hulse, With Tea Party in Mind, Republicans Have Change of Heart About
Earmarks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, at A19.
316. John Stanton, Panel Lays Down Law: Earmarks Are Over, ROLL CALL (May 2,
2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_114/House-Earmarks-Are-Over-205213-
1.html.
317. Carl Hulse, Senate Spending Panel Bans Earmarks for Two Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2011, at A16.
318. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Rivals Reach Consensus on New Earmark Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2010, at A19. For an example of criticism of the earmark process, see RONALD D.
UTT, HERITAGE FOUND., How CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS AND PORK BARREL SPENDING
UNDERMINE STATE AND LOCAL DECISIONMAKING (1999), available at http://www.heritage.
org/research/reports/1999/04/congressional-earmarks-and-spending-undermine-decisionmaking.
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Virtually all of the environmental and financial riders that were intro-
duced in the 104th and 112th Congresses came at the behest of companies
and trade associations with strong economic interests in changing the appli-
cable laws and regulations. But such special interest riders are
indistinguishable from earmarks that appropriate monies for specific "pork
barrel" projects in the districts of the sponsoring congresspersons.
Earmarks provide targeted funds to particular projects, while the deregula-
tory riders typically provide targeted regulatory relief for particular
industries. Indeed, from a policy-making perspective, deregulatory riders
can be more troubling than earmarks. Earmarks bestow public largess on a
favored constituency. Deregulatory riders force the targeted agencies to
take action, or refrain from taking action, in ways that would otherwise be
inconsistent with their authorizing statutes.3 19 The result can be ad hoc
policymaking that not only advantages a single favored industry or compa-
ny, but also "circumvent[s] long-standing ... policies."320
The "Pledge to America" upon which Republican candidates ran for the
House of Representatives went beyond earmarks. Among other things, the
pledge committed the candidates to "end[ing] the practice of packaging
unpopular bills with 'must-pass' legislation" and to "advanc[ing] major
legislation one issue at a time" -presumably a reference to riders. 32' But
apparently, the pledge did not include deregulatory riders. As we have seen,
riders aimed at hampering environmental and financial regulation were
rampant during the first session of the 112th Congress. The public recently
received a strong dose of media exposure to riders during the attempts by
conservative Republicans to extort concessions from the Obama admin-
istration in the unseemly battles over the debt ceiling. At the end of that
debacle, public approval of Congress sank to a modern-day low of just
fourteen percent, and only seventeen percent of Americans thought their
representative should be re-elected in 2012.322 Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke concluded that "the country would be well
served by a better process for making fiscal decisions."323 The same mem-
bers of Congress who attempted to extort concessions from the
administration are attempting to impose deregulatory riders on the Senate
and the President during the remainder of the 112th Congress. The media
should now focus its attention on these unsavory riders. A strong public
319. Zellmer, supra note 54, at 500.
320. Id. at 457; see also Lazarus, supra note 11, at 632 (complaining of "ad hoc, incoher-
ent lawmaking resulting from closed-door appropriations deal-making that is of questionable
efficacy for any area of law")
321. A PLEDGE TO AMERICA, supra note 221, at 33.
322. Helderman & Craighill, supra note 302.
323. Bernanke, supra note 9, at 12.
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reaction against deregulatory riders could induce the leaders of both parties
to prohibit them.
CONCLUSION
The 112th Congress has witnessed a re-emergence of the deregulatory
riders that characterized the battles between the Republican -controlled
104th Congress and the Clinton administration. That confrontation result-
ed in the longest government shutdown in the history of the United
324States. Although the public reacted strongly against the efforts by the
supporters of the riders to extort deregulatory concessions from the Clin-
ton administration, the FY 1996 appropriation legislation that Congress
enacted and the President signed contained several riders that advanced the
narrow economic interests of a few favored constituencies. For instance, the
legacy of the notorious salvage timber rider that survived the battles over
the FY 1995 continuing resolution included extensive and environmentally-
destructive logging "subsidized by the taxpayers."3 25 But the experience did
not dissuade the Republican leadership from attaching similar riders to
appropriation bills during the remainder of the Clinton years.
Unlike the Republican leaders of the 104th Congress, who gained very
little in their confrontation with President Clinton, Speaker of the House
John Boehner and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell saw them-
selves as the winners in the confrontation with President Obama over the
debt ceiling in July 2011.326 Senator McConnell has already promised that
more riders will be attached to the debt ceiling bill when it comes up in
early 2013 (assuming that President Obama is re-elected and that the
Republicans retain control of at least one house of Congress).327 Despite
their considerable costs to society, deregulatory riders will be proposed for
attachment to appropriation bills and other must-pass legislation as long as
divided government persists. Unless Congress takes steps to put its own
house in order by limiting the extortionate use of riders to advance the
narrow interests of a few over the interest of the broader public, the prac-
tice will continue to pose a serious threat to public respect for Congress as
an institution.
324. CLINTON T. BRASS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF THE
FEDERAL GoVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS 2 (2011).
325. Goldman & Boyles, supra note 66, at 1058.
326. See Davis & Garrett, supra note 11, at 30.
327. See Schlesinger, supra note 5.
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